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ABSTRACT
The new era of the world is characterised with the great expansion of economic, 
political, social and cultural relations across borders. Offering, the fast, reliable and 
massive transportation, aviation stands to be the most adequate transporting 
instrument in meeting the rapidly growing traffic in tourism, trade and business.
Notwithstanding its close affinity with globalisation urging for liberalisation, 
competition and multilateralism, aviation is still regulated by outmoded patchwork of 
restrictive bilateral treaties.
The international civil aviation system is experiencing a period of 
unprecedented turmoil. Four new trends, multilateralism, regionalism, plurilateralisrn 
and globalisation, are challenging the existing bilateral system.
The thesis intends to analyse the development of the international civil aviation 
system and to search the prospects for the international civil aviation system meeting 
globalisation.
ÖZET
1900’lü yılların başında başlayan sivil havacılık, bugün dünyanın en büyük ve 
en geniş endüstrilerinden biridir. Bununla birlikte sivil havacılığın, uluslararası 
sistemdeki artan önemi sadece ekonomik faktörlerle açıklanamaz. Sivil havacılık son 
elli yıl içersindeki gelişimi ile sadece en hızlı ulaşım aracı olarak kalmamış gerek 
dünya ticaretinin gelişiminde gerekse de değişik kültürlerin birbirini tanımasıda çok 
büyük etkiye sahip olmuş, hatta küreselleşmenin “itici gücü” sayılmıştır.
Teknolojinin ilerlemesi ve ekonominin gelişmesiyle sivil havacılık fiili olarak 
gelişmiş fakat trafik kuralların belirlenmesinde bir türlü uluslararası bir konsensus’a 
ulaşılamamış ve ilişkiler ikili anlaşmalarla yürütülmüştür. Dar kapsamlı ticaret 
çıkarlarının tartışıldığı ve korumacılığın ağır bastığı bu ikili anlaşmalar sistemi artık 
değişen dünyanın kurallarına uymamaktadır
Günümüzde uluslararası sivil havacılık sistemi hiç olmadığı kadar karmaşık ve 
belirsizdir. Her ne kadar ikili anlaşmalar esas mekanizma olarak işlevine devam 
etmekte ise de hem global hem de bölgesel bazda yeni trendler gelişmektedir.
Bu master tezinde öncelikle uluslararası sivil havacılık sisteminin gelişimi 
analiz edilmekte, ikincil olarak da gelecekte oluşması muhtemel uluslararası sivil 
havacılık sistemleri değerlendirilmektedir.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is in a transition. The expansion of economic, political, social and 
cultural relations across national borders and the movement towards more open 
markets has intensified. Air transport is international by its very nature and stands as 
the only instrument affording fast, reliable and massive transportation, required for 
the achievement of the social and economic cohesion.
Along with the immense growth of traffic in world, whether in tourism, trade, 
business or transport, the importance and power of the aviation industry have steadily 
grown. In addition to its spreading transporting mission, aviation is one of the most 
comprehensive and technologically advanced infrastructure industries in world 
driving economic growth and technological innovation. Given all, air transport is one 
of the prompters of globalisation.
Notwithstanding its global role in a new era characterised with the general 
movement towards freer worldwide trade in goods and services, it is still regulated 
by outmoded patchwork of restrictive bilateral treaties concluded between the 
governments of the airlines. Thanks to the greatest efforts of the United States and 
European Union, the two largest aviation markets, a certain level of liberalisation has 
consummated through the elimination of restrictions on capacity, pricing and access 
to routes, within the integrated market of EU and between the airspace of member 
states and U.S. However, a multilateral competitive aviation market is not likely not 
be attained by unilateral or bilateral liberal measures. A multilateral system would 
decline to achieve without the exclusion of restrictive rules, namely air sovereignty, 
nationality and cabotage, envisaged in 1944 Chicago Convention, the original source 
of the restrictive system.
The Chicago system recognised the states as the legal actors of the 
international civil aviation and reserved the right of domestic point-to-point service 
exclusively to the national airlines while prohibiting foreign citizens from owning or 
controlling national air carriers.
In the absence of multilaterally agreed air traffic rights, bilateral agreements 
remained as the only instrument for the exchange of these rights. Given, the 
economic, social, political and military connotations of civil aviation, states have 
attempted to keep their carriers free from the destructive influences of excessive 
competition and thus the bilateral system have best suited to the protectionist, narrow 
commercial interests of the countries.
As the air transport industry has expanded and matured, the government 
intervention in commercial matters of aviation began to be questioned. The first 
assault against this protectionist bilateral system came with the U.S. domestic airline 
deregulation in 1978 and the following “open skies” policy of U.S., aiming to 
deregulate the international air transport on a broad scale.
Although the success of the U.S. international policy had only been moderate, 
liberalisation incentives began to appear, albeit on a reduced scale. The most 
comprehensive movement has seen in the European Community. The internal and 
external dynamics impelled the member states to launch the process of integrating 
their national air transport markets into a Single European Aviation Market. The 
process ended with the abandonment of all cabotage restrictions for the intra-EU 
operations of EU-based airlines. However, the external aviation relations of the 
fifteen member states are still developed bilaterally. Thus, the Chicago/Bilateral 
system has not yet challenged.
In contrast to the movement towards a more competitive aviation system, the 
developing countries have sought to assure the existence of the Chicago system. 
However, the lack of resources and dependency to the aviation markets of developed 
countries made the change inevitable. Airline privatisation seemed as the most 
promising way to promote the efficiency of the aviation industry, but in the absence 
of a preparation process of airline to competition, privatisation yielded no gains.
Given the growing liberalisation in international air transport system, bilateral 
agreements can no more meet the requirements of system. Four new trends are 
candidate for becoming the successor of the bilateral system. The first one is, 
multilateralism proposed under the framework of GATT, the second is regionalism 
developed mainly with the example of EU, the third one is plurilateralism, offering a 
new U.S./EU North Atlantic multilateral compact and lastly, globalisation, developed 
with the airline alliances and code-sharing agreements.
The aim of this study is to make an analysis of the development of the 
international civil aviation system and to search the prospects for the international 
civil aviation system meeting globalisation.
In that respect, the first chapter provides a brief information for the role of civil 
aviation in a globalising world. The reasons why the international aviation system 
failed to adjust the premises of globalisation are explored.
In the second chapter, the development of the international aviation system is 
analysed in detail. In the first part of the chapter, the basic principles of Chicago 
system, namely the air sovereignty, cabotage and nationality rules, and their 
consequences to the system are examined. In the second part of the chapter, the 
general characteristics and the process of the bilateral system are carefully 
investigated.
The third chapter is composed of three parts. The first part involves the U.S. 
airline deregulation and its consequences in domestic and international aviation 
market. The second part explores the evolution and achievements of the liberalisation 
movement in European Union, in detail. In the third part, the effects of liberalisation 
in the air transport markets of the developing countries are discussed.
In the fourth and the last chapter four challenges to the existing system 
including, multilateralism, regionalism, plurilateralism and globalisation are analysed 
one by one.
CHAPTER I
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A GLOBALISING WORLD
Air transport has been one of the most important infrastructure industries of the
20“’ century by virtue of transforming lives, driving economic growth and 
technological innovation, and swaying the balance of power between states.' Air 
transport by nature is a global industry operating in an interconnected, illimitable and 
limitless international air traffic market where the airspaces of all countries are linked 
to each other. Individual sovereign states have complete and exclusive right to permit 
the usage of its airspace and, thus, extreme interdependency is evident in the air 
transport industry.
Air transport industry is highly dependent to technological innovations, national 
economic strength, commercial relations, global economic balances, and social 
interactions between communities. Since these values are dynamic in nature, the 
progress of international civil aviation is extremely in conjuncture with the 
international economic, political and social relations.
Notwithstanding the close relationship between civil aviation and international 
economic and political relations, the discipline of international relations has been in 
defiance of the issue until recently. In fact it was not unique either to the transport 
industry in general or to the air transport sector in particular. International relations, 
until 1970s, had incorporated the political and security relations of states and 
international organisations while omitting the economic and cultural relations. What 
made this to change was that of the collapse of Bretton-Woods agreement in 1971, 
the subsequent oil crisis and the emanation of newly independent states into the 
economic and political system of the world. The U.S. leadership in the management 
of the global economic relations, between 1945-1971, began to lose its position to the
emerging blocks of European Community, Asia-Pacific, and to a number of 
developing countries in Latin America. The interdependency of states has intensified 
with the growth of world trade and opening up of new markets. Along with these, the 
slow but steady effort to eliminate barriers to trade at the global level through the 
GATT system and correspondingly universal acceptance of the international trade as 
the desirable means of fostering economic growth, has prompted the process of 
globalisation.^
The world has irrevocably changed over the past two decades, however 
transformation in economic relations between states declines to explain the 
globalisation trend of 1990s. The geographical spread of economic activities across 
national borders can be named as ‘internationalisation’ instead o f ‘globalisation’ and 
in that sense it is not an unprecedented fact.^ Truly speaking, economic activities 
among Western colonial powers were much more free and interacted between the 
years of 1870-1914 than today.
The unequal and asymmetrical manner of the internationalisation is still on its 
way, however what makes the globalisation of today unique is that of its reference to 
the qualitative changes in the world system in terms of new structure of production, a 
new style of life with more leisure time, and the increased cultural and social 
relations between international communities with the spur of technology.
The industrialisation process in Western countries had provided a fertile ground 
for the development of an informed society adequate to produce new technological 
innovations. As a consequence of the basic changes in technology and shift in the 
global exchange rate system, the structure of the production has transformed from 
material production to information-processing activities and entirely new sectors of 
production have emerged, particularly in the fields of the service sector including
transport, travel, communications services, financial services, computer services and 
other services ranging from business services to cultural services.'* The rise in the 
amount of trade in commercial services from 19.5 per cent of total trade in 1985 to 
23.29 per cent in 1995 proves the changes in the composition of trade along with the 
general increase in the magnitude of trade. ^  In fact, the provision of services now 
constitutes for the U.S. and other major industrial powers a larger proportion of Gross 
National Product, GNP, than does the production of goods.^ Along with the shift in 
the structure of production, the role of individuals has grown at each stage of 
production and consumption. The process promoted the development of consumerism 
asking for more competition and liberalisation.
The new production structure and doctrines of West urging for freer trade, 
competition, consumer choice and resigned government intervention, have found a 
unique opportunity to expand worldwide in the aftermath of the end of the Cold-War 
when all ideological borders have exterminated.
The globalisation in that sense referred to the expansion of economic, political, 
social, and cultural relations across borders.
1.1.Globalisation and International Civil Aviation
The globalisation had two consequences on the international aviation. First of 
all, international relations discipline realised that aviation should be regarded as one 
of an element of the international relations, particularly in regards to its increasing 
role in a globalising world, secondly the outmoded system of international aviation 
began to be questioned.
Backed by the advanced technology, globalisation has made the world smaller, 
in terms of reaching more data about societies and all fields of science. On the other 
hand the world has become larger with the new coming of understanding that every
specific issue has an impact over the development of the world’s and politic and 
economic system.
Correspondingly, the international relations as a discipline felt the need to 
enrich its sphere of understanding of what has to be called as ‘relations’. In other 
words, it has been realised that international relations are indivisible and every 
specific issue has to be searched and analysed in order to develop comprehensive 
strategies for the international relations. Specialisation, in international relations, 
searching the issue-areas that lie outside the zero-sum realm of security, brought its 
attention to the issue of transportation and of aviation.
In fact, international aviation has embodied all the economic, politic, security 
and social items of the international relations. However what makes the issue unique 
to search today, is its correlation with all ‘new’ aspects of the New World system 
such as, new economic system, new composition of trade, new living style, new 
markets and newly expanded social and cultural relations among communities.
The expansion of social and economic relations, growing tourism industry, an 
increased involvement of the private sector, and the needed of transport services to 
remote areas, required more than ever fast, reliable and massive transportation.^ As 
being the most comprehensive and technologically advanced infrastructure industry, 
aviation involved all the requirements of the New World system.
In that respect, the importance and power of air transportation have steadily 
grown, developed something like a boom, and along with communications it has 
become one of the driving force behind globalisation.*
Despite its close affinity with globalisation, the respond of air transport system 
towards its premises described as, freer trade, exclusion of government intervention, 
market economy, economic transparency, competition law, consumer choice and
multilateral treatment, came much later than any other industry or service in the 
world. Notwithstanding the premises of globalisation, the industry of air 
transportation is unique in terms of the obstacles and restrictions imposed on it. As 
Oliver Lissitzyn has put forward: “No other world-wide economic activity of 
comparable magnitude is more throughly regulated, less free of official restraint and 
guidance, than is air transport”.^  Thus, while the world is trying to resign from 
protectionist and managed trade in most goods and services, the air transport ensuring 
the carriage is still characterised by regulation, protection and direct state
intervention. 10
The essence of the international air transport regulatory system is based on 
individual sovereignty, nationality, cabotage and bilateralism. These premises are the 
elements of mercantilist interests that takes airspace as the property of sovereign 
states and require permission of state authorities for its usage. Globalisation of the 
international aviation system will fall short of unless these pillars dismantle.
Many fields of the international relations whether economic or cultural are 
subject to multilateral treatment and only few reserved sectors are formally resolved 
by bilateral arrangements between states. Air transportation is one of them. Proven in 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, annex of Uruguay Round, states 
failed to reach to a multilateral comprise on the ‘hard’ issues of traffic rights 
including; market access, capacity, frequency, cabotage and rate-making. Beyond 
certain ancillary services, such as aircraft handling and maintenance, the latest draft 
of the GATS Annex on Air Transporting Services does not envisage a liberalisation 
progress for the sector generally.*^ Notwithstanding of being a global activity, no 
international regime exists in aviation.
Reasons why no such common lot exit can be drawn up with parallel to the 
question that why the state intervention has been so dominant in this line of activity.
1.2.National Interests in Air Transport
Air Transportation, even in more market-oriented states, has traditionally been 
subject to the highly protectionist treatment of the states where cartels or monopolies 
were the norm and competition the exception.*^ Excluding United States, most of the 
airlines in world were government-owned or heavily subsidised by governments. 
That situation has appeared to change with the movement of airline deregulation, and 
emerging trend toward airline privatisation. However, states are still keen to retain 
their discretion capacity in issues concerning their national share in international air 
transportation. Therefore, most of the deregulation efforts embody only domestic 
services whereas traditional principles are still carried out in international regulation.
The resistance of states to any change reflected the security, economic, social, 
and political importance attached to the civil aviation by governments.’^
The contribution of aviation to national defence is beyond doubt and proven in 
two World Wars. However the security concern of states with regards to civil 
aviation, is related to the potential threat for the photographing of military 
installations and the conversion of civil aircraft to military purposes including the 
transportation of troops, armaments and other logistic needs during the war.’'’ For 
instance, the government of United States established Civil Reserve Air Fleet, CRAF, 
program just after the World War II in order mobilise the civil aircrafts for military 
use in times of national emergency.’^
Along with the evolution of air transport, interests and purposes of states 
swapped accordingly. The contemporary government interests in air transportation 
are mostly centred on economic interests rather than defence. The air traffic control
10
system is sophisticated enough to keep aircrafts away from sensitive areas and to 
defend itself with long range missiles and nuclear weapons.
Apart from the security considerations, showing the flag around the world has 
respected as a national prestige, particularly at the infant times of the aviation. 
Besides air transportation had been a good instrument in the cold war era for 
propaganda distribution and cultural penetrations between nations.
Although the purposes served by the national air carriers differ from one 
country to other, the general spur behind the policies of states is more or less centred 
on the economic and social considerations. From the social standpoint, the goal of 
states is to optimise the public service. In regards of economics, the general aim is to 
optimise the national share in international air transport trade in the view of its 
significant contribution on national balance of payments.
1.2.1.The First End: Ensuring the Public Utility
The main obstacle for the privatisation of state-owned airlines has been the 
uneasiness of governments in giving up of the management of a public utility service. 
For many years flag-carriers operated to grant adequate, flexible and inexpensive air 
transport to the society. Both international and domestic air transport services were 
expected to be under the government responsibility not only for safety concerns or 
comfort but for the link of domestic cities even to places where the demand does not 
justify the supply.’* Making profit was not the primary aim of state owned airlines 
and therefore the entrance of foreign airlines was restricted in order to limit the 
injurious competition.
Aviation industry requires a complex and huge infrastructure facilities. 
Considerable number of people is working as ground or flying personnel and also in
11
the repair and control sections of aircrafts. So, flag carriers provide a great deal of 
employment within their countries.
In time, the meaning of public utility has changed in developed countries. In the 
infant times of the aviation states were more inclined to protectionist attitudes and 
more squeezed with the public utility concept. As the aviation industry has grown and 
matured and the demand has increased, the stands of states sloped towards 
privatisation.*^ The redefinition of the meaning of public utility is a prerequisite for 
airline privatisation. First the U.S. and then some other European states liberalised the 
definition of public utility and replaced with consumer choice. Accordingly, 
customers would benefit from the free competition through getting the best service at 
lowest price. Previously, passengers were getting insufficient service without 
benefiting from lower prices.
On the other hand, particularly developing countries still prop up the ‘public 
welfare’ school of transport regulation for the virtue of justifying their protectionist 
policies and restrictions denying competition.
1.2.2.The Second End: Economic Motivations
International air transportation has direct and indirect effects on the GNP of
states.
Aviation offers a great opportunity to states to earn foreign exchange and 
improve the national balance of payments. As a precedent, the total yearly value of all 
revenues from scheduled and non-scheduled airlines is approximately $200 billion 
equivalent to about 1.5 per cent of world GNP. Besides the revenues of international 
air services amount to some $100 billion equivalent to 7 per cent of world export in 
manufactured goods.
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Even precluding the flow of foreign currency from the country instead of 
earning foreign currency explains the general tendency of states to support and 
protect their national airline. As long as the international air transport business 
continues to grow, national airlines will seek to expand their operations on 
international routes as to maximise their share in market.
Additionally, through providing transport facilities, aviation has circuitous 
financial aids to the domestic economy, such as the increase in tourist revenues, 
enlargement of markets, creation of new business and its stimulation of the overall 
economic development.
The origin and size of an international market is in proportion of the 
convenience of adequate transport facilities for the exchange of goods and for 
business and leisure. A transport facility by itself creates traffic and trade including 
trade in services and that means money, progress and prosperity .The growth of 
traffic invents more traffic and in due course promotes trade and in turn prepares the 
financial ground for the creation of a market. Added to that, being a global market 
requires the integration of both domestic and international markets where tight 
communication remains the main instrument.
In that context, civil aviation as a transport activity abets the creation and 
expansion of markets. Forty per cent of international trade today travels by air, and it 
is likely to increase more with the rapid growth of the trade of services that merely 
involve peoples instead of goods.
In brief, given its direct and indirect contribution to the GNP of states, 
international aviation is itself a trade market while serving and enlarging other 
markets.
13.
Finally, it is worth to note that, in most of the cases, the social and economic 
considerations of states are in friction. States, motivated with more economic designs, 
dwelled on export-oriented policies and thus failed to meet the demand in domestic 
routes. On the other hand most states, for decades, have been engrossed in serving the 
domestic traffic instead of seeking more revenue from the international travel market. 
Even United States has put special emphasis to the domestic air services through 
establishing the “Small Community” program, which guaranteed subsidised air 
services, to small or isolated city-points.Notwithstanding the deregulation in 
domestic regulation, this program has never been sunsetted. On other hand, US 
aviation policy has always been much more export-oriented compared to other 
nations.
Today, states are still struggling to harmonise their air transport policy between 
public services objectives and protection of the national share in international air 
transport business.
Apparently, no country in the world is likely to free air transport totally from 
the government control due to the close connotations between air transport and state 
sovereignty, public interest, trade and international relations. However, governments 
are receding their direct intervention on domestic traffic and increasing attention on 
indirect regulatory measures such as taxes, customs, transfer facilities, subsidies.
24etc.
1.2.3.Conflicting National Policies in International Contest
The foreign air policy objectives of different countries aimed at optimising and 
maximising their respective shares in the international air transport services trade, by 
nature, opposed to, and in conflict with each o th e r .S in c e  the magnitude of 
commercial aviation has grown to huge amounts, nations seek broader access to
14
international markets for their airlines and try to defence their home carrier’s market 
share through bilateral air transport agreements. States fail to insulate air treaty 
negotiations from general trade diplomacy and consequently bilateral negotiations 
seem like a battleground of national objectives of each state.
Bilateral agreements are just like treaties and bargaining strength of parties is 
not necessarily related to air transport itself Non-aviation issues often influence the 
final outcome. Henceforth, states perceive the issue as a part of their national interest 
rather than a commercial business save for safety and environment concerns.
Aviation is a global industry and requires the participation of all countries in the 
world. Referring to the global situation, it is evident that the time has come for a new 
global regime for aviation regulation.The present bilateral regime is outmoded and 
increasingly in conflict with the realities of a changing world. Global strategies 
should be implemented to meet the global transformations.
15
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AJH TRANSPORT SYSTEM
The reason why the international air transport failed to develop a universal 
regime is closely related to the evolution of international relations. ’
In fact, aviation itself developed only at the beginning of 20*’’ century and the 
expeditious development in technology added to the radical shifts in economic and 
political balance of power in international relations strongly influenced its progress. 
Interestingly the theoreticians had repeatedly altered their hypothesises on the legal 
status of airspace as a result of the dramatic change^ in international system.
Hence, in contrast to the long historical evolution of the maritime law, the legal 
concepts of airspace in international law have not occurred as a result of theoretical 
concepts. The theoreticians simply attempted to follow the practice of states.
2.1.Legislation of International Aviation before Chicago Convention
Prior to the First World War, there were two positions in respect to the legal 
status of the airspace namely, “freedom of the airspace” and the “air sovereignty”.
In like manner of the propositions of Grotious, favoured the freedom of the 
seas, the defenders of “freedom of airspace” theory argued that as long as the air was 
a res communis, the right of states above the airspace of its territory should be limited 
only to self-defence.
On the other hand, the supporters of the “air sovereignty” theory, asserted that 
states were sovereign over the airspace above their territories and have exclusive 
authority to decide the entry of foreign aircraft into its national airspace. The only 
limitation would be the right of innocent passage of foreign aircraft through territorial 
space.^
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In these years, the social benefits of civil aviation had not yet been ililly 
absorbed but the threats that it might cause to national security and public order had 
always been evident. Thus, the stands of most states were close to the theory of 
sovereignty while the theoretical disputations were going on.
The First World War had proven the veracity of the practices of the states. The 
theory of the freedom of the airspace largely abandoned and the need of universal 
rules for air navigation rather than unilateral practices had become apparent.
In that respect, 32 states in 1919, in the aftermath of the war, convened in Paris 
Conference in order to formulate a uniform aviation policy.
It is worth to note that the British draft convention submitted at Paris 1919, was 
so interesting in a sense that for the first time the item of freedoms of air, bears a 
marked resemblance to the American proposal at Chicago 1944, had brought to the 
discussion of states. Three freedoms had foreseen for the commercial flights of 
foreign states in the draft convention. According to that, foreign aircrafts would have 
the right to, land the whole or part of its passengers or goods brought from abroad, to 
take on board the whole or part of its passengers or goods from a foreign destination 
and lastly to carry passengers or goods between two points consigned for through 
transit to or from some place outside the teiritory of the Contracting States.
In fact, the prevailing purpose of United Kingdom was to balance its security 
and commercial interests. Foreign restrictions on British aircraft would limit the 
Britain’s world commerce and communication with Commonwealth States. On the 
other hand, free entry of foreign aircraft into the British airspace could threat its 
national security as well."* In that regard Britain was in favour of the rule of greatest 
liberty for commercial air traffic while defending the doctrine of air sovereignty for 
defence purposes.
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The British draft convention was rejected in Paris Convention and a much more 
restrictive text was adopted/
Ironically, it was Britain that rejected a resembling proposal of U.S. in 1944, 
urging for a liberal multilateral air transport system.
2.1.1.The Paris Convention of 1919
The Paris Convention is the ancestor of the Chicago Convention. The legal 
restrictive international aviation system launched at the Paris Convention through the 
recognition of the complete and exclusive sovereignty right of state in its airspace 
above national territory, only with the exception of innocent passage as in the case of 
maritime law. This principle of air sovereignty remained enshrined as the 
international aviation system’s foundation.^
The transit and landing rights for foreign airlines limited to the explicit 
authorisation of the national governments. Strict territorial sovereignty over a state’s 
sovereignty insured that the national governments would play a prominent role in the 
economic and political development of international civil aviation.^
The outcome of Paris Conference resembles the Chicago Convention in terms 
of its failure in consummating a multilateral system exchanging the air traffic rights 
commonly. Worth to notice that, the bilateral system in international civil aviation 
was launched with the Paris Convention contrary to the general knowledge of being 
generated in Chicago Convention of 1944. What the Article 6 of the latter one has 
achieved for bilateral system, had been well established in the Article 15 oi the 
former one.
Article 15 had foreseen that, every aircraft of a contracting state has the right to 
cross another state without landing but the international commercial air routes would 
be fixed by the state flown over. In that regard airlines would not have the right to opt
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for the shortest route notwithstanding the recognised innocent passage right and be 
obliged to establish bilateral negotiations with each country that it flown over. 
Straight political bargaining was accepted as the rule to be followed.^
2.2. The Inter-War Period
In the inter-war period, air transport had two gists regarding the attitudes of 
countries. The first one was security and the other was commerce.
In the first half of the period, between 1920 and 1930, a peaceful international 
environment was relevant and therefore the foremost interests of states in 
international aviation were the air travel and the inter-colonial air communication. In 
that respect, most of the colonial powers such as France, Britain, Belgium and the 
Netherlands focussed their individual resources in the development of a single 
national air carrier.^ A strict communication was needed with the overseas colonies 
and such kind of an important issue could not be left to private carriers since 
competing states were not keen to allow commercial operation of other colonial 
state’s airline in its territorial airspace.
On the other hand, the U.S. government was not interested in such kind of 
institution of a single national carrier due to various reasons. Remarkably, the 
geographical location of state was demanding a highly developed air transport system 
not only for the domestic traffic but also for international passenger and cargo traffic. 
This requirement might have been met by a single air carrier yet the understanding of 
the role of the government was much more different from European states. Therefore, 
instead of direct state intervention, U.S. government developed a system of 
‘controlled competition’ in which the privately owned airlines were allowed to 
operate for profit purposes in the routes approved by the government.
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Added to that, unlike the European colonial powers, United States had no 
overseas colonies to and, thus, concentrated on increasing passenger traffic and mail 
transformation on rapidly expanding international routes.
There were four big private carriers operating in the transcontinental routes. 
United Air Lines, Eastern Airlines, American Airlines and Trans World Airlines. In 
addition to these there was also another one. Pan American World Airways, which 
was totally allocated to international air traffic.
The first half of the interwar era, 1918-1929, was relatively liberal compared to 
the second half, 1929-1939. The leading air powers, both United States and United 
Kingdom and major civil aviation powers in Europe, during the 1920s put forth effort 
to establish a liberal international aviation system, however, attempts to formulate a 
uniform aviation policy had repeatedly failed.
In the second half, dramatic changes in the international economic and political 
order had profound impact over the advance of international civil aviation. First, the 
world economic depression of 1929 made states to take protectionist measures in 
economic issues including civil aviation. Secondly, the emergence of the Nazis in 
Germany in 1933 once again urged both European states and United States to convert 
their aviation industry to the production of military aircraft.^*
United States reversed its liberal position and enacted the ‘Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938’ which reserved the right to set up any conditions that it saw necessary 
on the entry of foreign aircraft into the territorial airspace. Acting similarly, United 
Kingdom took protectionist measures and for the first time its aviation policy stood in
dramatic contrast to its longstanding advocacy of liberalism in maritime commerce. 13
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2.3. The Chicago Convention of 1944: Bible of International Civil Aviation
The 1944 Chicago Convention constitutes the basic multilateral framework for 
the public law regime of international civil aviation.
Technologically speaking, the global air transport is in the jet age ready to 
encounter the millennium, yet ironically its core values of regulation are based on a 
system designed in its infant stages of 1944.
2.3.1.The Background of the Convention
The Chicago Convention is a political achievement. It was conducted at the 
final stages of the war in a condition of totally changed international balance of 
power.
The rise of national wealth added to the improvements in technology. United 
States came out of the World War II as the new political and economical hegemon of 
the international system. On the other hand, the war had seriously weakened the 
Western European allies and most of them declined to be a great power.
Despite its relative decline in power, Britain preserved its sufficient resources 
to continue its claim as an important power in aviation. Proven in the Chicago 
Conference, the provisions of the international civil aviation system were resolved by 
two big aviation powers, Britain and the United States.
Notwithstanding being the closest of allies at the time, the Big Two carried 
different understandings for the future architecture of world aviation. The 
fundamental conflict was not security but the distribution of the economic benefits in 
the postwar international aviation system.
Beyond doubt. United States emerged from the war as the world’s dominant 
aviation power both in terms of aircraft production and technological expertise. In 
fact, it was closely related to an agreement concluded in wartime between United
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States and United Kingdom, which envisaged the division of labour in the production 
of aircraft. In that context, U.S. had specialised on long-ranged and large-capacity 
bombardment aircraft while Britain had localised on fighter aircraft. This division 
of labour provided United States the opportunity to convert its massive fleet to 
civilian use at the end of the war. Compared to the 12 per cent share of British air 
carriers in the world air commence, U.S. carriers were holding a record of 72 per 
cent. Other European nations were in worse positions since they had devoted their 
full resources to the war effort and ignored the production of commercial aircraft. 
Certainly no country in the world was able to compete with American aeronautical 
equipment and highly adequate personnel.
Under these conditions, the U.S. liberal standpoint urging the application of 
open market principles to capacity, frequency and fares is intelligible.
In fact, the U.S. assertion was consistent with its general claims for the 
regulation of the postwar international order. According to U.S. thesis, protectionist 
economic policies were the main reason for the rise of destructive nationalism and 
emergence of hostilities between states. Obstacles to the free flow of the commerce 
should be eliminated for the endurance of peace. In that context, U.S. allocated its 
diplomatic negotiations on the issue of the free transportation of goods and services 
and the free transport in air.
Invitation of U.S. to an international civil aviation conference in 1944 was 
responded by fifty-two states. However it has to be noted that, although it was a 
multilateral conference, the conference soon became polarised, with Latin America 
adhering United States while most of the Western European States together with the 
Commonwealth lined up behind Britain.
2 2
The two powers took dramatically opposed positions, “market-based 
competition” versus “authority based regulation”. The U.S. urged for the foundation 
of a competitive multilateral system whereas Britain insisted upon the establishment 
of an international regulatory body keeping real executive power to coordinate traffic, 
routes, fares and frequencies on an equitable basis among countries, which would 
avoid wasteful competition.
The position of Britain was identical with the theory of balance of power. 
Accordingly, states having the powerful and efficient enterprises are likely to make 
better profits in an open market competition and tend to support a more liberal 
institutional framework. Conversely, the states with weaker and less efficient 
enterprises are likely to spur an institutional framework that allows the adoption of 
protectionist and restrictive policies. Generally speaking, institutionalisation of the 
regulatory mechanism would limit the unilateral acts and help to preserve the status- 
ciuo while providing a fair period of time for the recoveiy of all.
The battle of two opposite camps continued during the Chicago Conference and 
the quarrel sometimes carried to the highest levels of the two governments. Franklin 
Roosevelt cautioned Winston Churchill about the British resistance to a generally 
beneficial air agreement and linked the issue with the continuation of Lend-Lease 
Act.^° On the other side, Britain tried to get the spur of the international community 
by calling up, “the choice before the world lies between Americanisation and 
internationalisation”.^ * In that regard, Chicago Convention was a political 
achievement.
The Conference convened in such kind of an environment. The motive behind 
the position of United States was not to supply the collective gains but rather to 
exploit its own air suprem acy.O n the other side, the purpose of Britain was to
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secure the equal distribution of economic profits on worldwide aviation until the 
recovery of its aviation industry. The inclination of other participants was to prevent a 
liberal multilateral air transport agreement that would confer the monopoly of U.S. 
carriers in international routes.
2.4. The Chicago Convention: Multilateral Consensus on Bilateralism
Before going to deep evaluation of the legal consequences of Chicago 
Convention, it is worth to explain the achievements of the Convention.
United States, parallel to its desire of granting multilateral exchange of rights of 
market access, demanded the adoption o f ‘five freedoms of the air’ defined as:^ ^
1. First Freedom-lh& privilege to fly across the territory of a contracting 
State;
2. Second Freedom-the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes, such as 
refuelling or maintenance, without offering any commercial service;
3. Third Freedom-Xht privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo 
taken on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
4. Fourth Freedom-XhQ privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo 
destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft 
possesses;
5. Fifth Freedom-the privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo 
destined for the territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to 
put down passengers, mail and cargo from any such territory.
Although the participating nations agreed that a certain amount of fifth freedom* 
traffic rights was essential to the profitability of many international air routes, 
multilateral granting of fifth-freedom rights was rejected in the Chicago 
Conference.^"  ^ Taking into account of the feebleness of the aviation industry, many
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nations have felt the necessity to maintain control over the economic regulation of 
civil aviation through taking protectionist measures for their national a ir lin e s .In  
that context, a bilateral system of exchanging traffic rights based on reciprocity 
would better serve to the national interests.
Along with these considerations, the focal point of the dispute between Europe 
and United States was that of the exchange of the fifth freedom which allows one 
state’s airlines to carry the traffic of the third states from and to the other state on 
their outward and inward flights.Evidently that would give American carriers the 
outward right to take the traffic originating in European countries, particularly in 
Britain, for non-U. S. designations and proclaim its domination in the skies.
As a result of the unwillingness of states to affirm a multilateral agreement, two 
supplementary agreements attached to Chicago Convention submitted to the approval 
of states. These agreements were the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 
lASTA, and the International Air Transport Agreement, lATAg. No controversy had 
arouse during the ratification of the I AST A, which involved the only the first two 
non-commercial rights, having no direct impact over the distribution of economic 
benefits.
In contrast to the general stand of states the lATAg incorporated all the five 
freedoms, both technical and commercial rights, thus no more than eleven states 
became party of it.
As the civil aviation has grown and matured, four new traffic rights have 
joined to the bilateral negotiations in the subsequent years of Chicago Conference, 
namely:
6. Sixth Freedom-\h.t privilege of carrying passengers, mail and cargo between the 
territories of two foreign states via territory of the home state of the aircraft. Sixth
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freedom can also be viewed as the combination of third and fourth freedoms 
permits a carrier to carry traffic between two different countries with a stop in the 
state in which it is registered, but without express permission under one
agreement 27
7. Seventh Freedom-ihQ privilege to carry passengers, mail and cargo between the 
territories of two foreign states without calling on the territory of the home state 
of the aircraft on a route which neither begins or ends in that home country.^*
8. Eight Freedom-Ûiis freedom is also noticed as cabotage right, being the privilege 
to carry passengers, mail and cargo from one point in the territory of a foreign 
state to another point in the same territory. Today, this freedom is most 
commonly known as “regional cabotage”, being the privilege to carry traffic 
between two foreign countries by the carriers belonging to the same region 
without any restriction of market access. Conclusion of such kind of regional 
arrangements limits the entry of other third state carriers to the region.
9. Ninth Freedom-Xhis freedom is cabotage in pure form, the privilege to pick up or 
set down passengers, mail and cargo between two domestic points.
The Chicago Conference established a balance between the interests of all 
states and reconciled the opposing views of liberalism and regulation. However, 
conference declined to achieve a consensus on a system to exchange the ‘freedoms of 
the air’ among nations.
Briefly stating, Chicago Convention was a multilateral consensus on the non­
regulation of the international civil aviation. The two polarised positions of 
Conference neutralised each other and reached a zero. Funnily, the states agreed on 
this zero.
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Notwithstanding the failure of establishing multilaterally agreed rules, states 
succeeded in maintaining the core values of the post-war aviation system described 
as, air sovereignty, cabotage and nationality principles, the principle of ‘equality of 
opportunity’ and the differentiation of international air services. The all Participant 
States ratified the Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly known as 
Chicago Convention, containing the basic principles.
2.5. Basic Principles of Chicago Convention
The legal structure of Chicago Convention is very different from the other 
international agreements. It reversed the general practice of first laying down the 
rules and then putting reservations. Contracting states first agreed on restrictions and 
then tried to put the rules.
The most elemental principle of this restrictive system was the doctrine of air 
sovereignty and its twins, cabotage and nationality rule.
2.5.1.The Reconfirmation of Air Sovereignty
The Chicago Convention reaffirmed the doctrine of air sovereignty that had 
first recognised in the Paris Conference. Accordingly, the exclusive authority of 
states to control all activity, including commercial flight within its national airspace, 
has approved. The understandings of two conferences on the principle of sovereignty 
were different. In 1919, sovereignty had mostly referred to security concerns whereas 
in 1944 it pertained mostly to commercial considerations.
Article 1 and <5, of the Chicago Convention, referred as the chart of bilateralism, 
has reinforced the concept of ‘permanent sovereignty’ of the state over its national 
natural resources.
Article 1: The contracting States recognise that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
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Article 6: No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into 
the territory of a contracting state except with the special permission or other 
authorisation of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or 
authorisation.
The combination of two articles had enormous implications over the 
development of the international civil aviation system. These are as follows:
1. They are largely responsible for the mass of bilateral agreements emerged 
since then.
2. Civil aviation has become a part of the ‘face’ of the state and provided a 
fertile ground for the protectionist measures of States.
3. A divergent treatment towards scheduled and non-scheduled air services has 
developed.
2.5.1.1. The Embracement of Bilateralism
As will be recalled, the ‘closed’ system of international aviation designed at 
Chicago has strengthened the regulatory power of state authorities on civil aviation. 
As a natural consequence states became the main actors of the international civil 
aviation. As will be explored, the primary question of the deregulation movement in 
1980s, was centred on this designated role of states and the ones against deregulation 
asked “without the government representation who will negotiate for who”.
The system adopted at the Chicago Convention, prohibiting the commercial 
operation of all foreign airlines without the special permission of the state whose 
territorial airspace was utilised, expressly denied any multilateral granting of rights 
for international scheduled air services.^^ The only viable option was the development 
of bilateral treaties as the principal diplomatic and political vehicle for the 
determination of route assignments, frequencies, and capacities.
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In like manner of bilateral exchange mechanism in other industries, the essence 
of concluding bilateral treaties in air transport was to exchange the narrow 
commercial interests on the basis of defensive reciprocity.^^ Although, the Chicago 
Convention itself did not envisage a bilateral method of exchange, bilaterals have 
become the “prime source of norms for the economic regulation of international 
aviation”.^ '* A massive case-by-case negotiation and exchange of literally thousands 
of international air routes has at the end looked like a “labyrinthine legal grotto.”
Bilateral exchange of air freedoms has notable differences from the other 
bilateral agreements in other sectors. Aviation by its nature is a global activity and 
any change in international routes has direct impact on the air transport market of 
particular region or the world. The Chicago/Bilateral system has established a one- 
vote system for each individual state in the regulation of the international air 
transport. The extent of opening its airspace to the operation of a foreign airline 
depends on how generously it and its bilateral partner wished to make concessions for 
the exchange international air services.^^ On the other hand, there is always a third 
state syndrome, especially for the exchange of the fifth freedom, during and after the 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement. A third concerned country may well block the 
application of the agreement through closing its airspace.
2.5.2. The Principle of “Equality of Opportunity”
The preamble of the Chicago Convention expresses concisely that the 
international air transport services must be established on the basis of equality of 
opportunity and participation.
However the implementation of this principle has hampered by the states 
practice of bilateralism. What the Convention put forth in theory and what it achieved 
in practice is inconsistent. The implication of such kind of a equality principle could
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have only been accomplished in a multilateral system where the defensive reciprocity 
principle is not the rule. Air transport agreements were the outcome of the 
compromise of concessions and gains of two partners grounded on their bargaining 
strength.
Aviation itself is an industry depends on geographic situation and location, 
stage of technological development, size of air traffic market, international 
affiliations, trade relations and also the political and economic strength of the states. 
States are not equal on the issued subjects so how can a system based on equal 
opportunity principle be instituted.
Moreover the position of the air carriers in the international competitive system 
were not based on equal advantages. So many differences existed and still do, 
between the practices of governments in such matters as “airport and navigation 
charges, access to facilities, availability and pricing of fuel, taxation, subsidisation,
o o
remittance of funds, and currency exchange rates.”
2.5.3. Differentiation of International Air Services and Freedoms
In contrast to the restrictive system adopted in Chicago for scheduled flights. 
Article 5 perfected a free and flexible system for the non-scheduled air transport 
services.
Article 5; “Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of contracting States, 
being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right 
to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for 
non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission and subject 
to the right of the State flown over to require landing.”
On the other hand Article 6 limited the operation of the scheduled international 
air services to the special permission of the State flown over. This controversial
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situation doubled with the legal uncertainty in the definition of the non-scheduled 
international air services. The definition of non-scheduled air service foreseen in 
Article 5 was that, ‘aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services’. The 
difference of two air services could only been made according to the practices of the 
states since no explicit definition had been proposed for the scheduled air services. 
Accordingly, the non-scheduled air services referred to irregular air services not 
carried out according to a published timetable and subject to fixed rate and tariffs that 
are appropriate to scheduled air services.
The sharp expansion in demand for additional air transport services in 1960s, 
brought about the tremendous increase in number of charter flights. The ever- 
increasing number of charter flights has posed a great threat to the scheduled air 
services.'*'’ States, thus, began to question the double controversial, liberal and 
restrictive, system of international air transport formulated in Chicago Convention. 
2.5.4 The Sovereignty Twins: Cabotage and Nationality Rules
2.5.4.1.The Doctrine of Cabotage: A Priori Principle of Exclusion 
In the field of international aviation cabotage refers exclusive right of national 
carriers to operate the commercial transportation of passengers, cargo and mail 
between the two points of national territory.
The Chicago Convention implied the cabotage as the subject of the sovereignty 
principle.
Each contracting state shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft 
of another contracting state to take on its territory passengers, mail and 
cargo carried for remuneration and hire designated for another point within 
its territory.
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However in the second part, Article 7 stipulated that states could not 
specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other state or an 
airline of any other state.
Cabotage restrictions had deliberately embraced by the contracting states of the 
Chicago Convention in the view of the security, prestige and public interest 
considerations. In a globalising post-Cold War economy the lasting insistence on 
aviation cabotage is mainly because of the economic reasons originated from the aim 
of protecting the state’s own navigation.
The cabotage principle remains as a real obstacle to the liberalisation of the 
international air transport industry.
2.5.4.2. The Nationality Rule: The Legal End of Protectionism
In parallel to the cabotage rule, the nationality principle emanated from the 
security considerations of the states. The interesting point here is that, in contrast to 
its liberal stand, the champion of both the cabotage and nationality principles in the 
Conference was United States. It was first the national security and then economic 
considerations that made U.S. preoccupy with both principles. As time passed these 
concerns turned merely into economic interests. Whatever the motivation of states 
either security or economic, they all aimed to promote safety and transparency in the 
international aviation system.
Article 17 oi the Convention states that, aircraft have the nationality of the state 
in which they are registered.
In terms of the safety concerns, contracting States intended to get the 
operational guarantee, insurance and liability, of the designated · airlines from the 
State whose nationality the airline possess. Since the exchange of traffic rights, 
especially frequency and capacity, was to be concluded between states through
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bilateral agreements, the full responsibility of the international operations of the 
scheduled airlines would be on the Governments Parties.'*  ^ Therefore every scheduled 
airlines operating internationally have to secure the national license from its own 
authorities in order to get the ‘operating permit’ of the other states.
Transparency and Ownership: The Parties of a bilateral air service agreement 
would like to know the real owners of the airlines, that may be different from its 
place of registration, due to four reasons.
First of all to prevent the air service operations of the enemy states, secondly to 
protect the domestic airline industry from the competition of potential rivals, thirdly 
to ensure the public utility, which may otherwise be neglected, and lastly to preclude 
the benefiting of the foreign nationals from the subsidiaries and other rights obtained 
by the state. The designated airline should be substantially owned, and effectively 
controlled, by the nationals of the State.
The negotiators of the Chicago decided to include the provisions relating the 
ownership of airlines to the Transit ant Transport Agreements. Accordingly:
Each contracting state reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate 
or permit to an air transport enterprise of another state in any case where it 
is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in 
nationals of a contracting state.'*^
Phrasing ‘nationals’, the word was expressly the check of the ‘effective 
control’ principle since it converted to the domestic laws of contracting states as the 
obligation that the seventy-five per cent voting interest would be owned and 
controlled by the citizens of the state whose flag they flew.
The airline ownership restrictions have aggravated the protectionism in the air 
transport industry. First of all, it strictly limited the per cent of the share of the foreign
33
investment and thus hampered the establishment of multinational airline corporations. 
As a consequence it blocked the subsequent attempts aimed to set up a multilateral air 
transport system.
Secondly, the ownership principle perfected the logic of the government 
intervention to the airline marketplace through getting the whole ownership and 
control of the flag carriers. Air transport has nationalised and airlines became the 
properties of the governments in most of the countries since it was believed that only 
state authorities could ensure financial stability, operational safety, regularity and 
continuity in postwar aviation system.
Naturally states have taken a more protectionist approach in their regulation of 
airlines.'''* The state controlled airlines has utilised for the government’s internal and 
external goals and declined to make profitable transport services. In order counter the 
inefficiency of the flag carriers states excluded the foreign airlines from domestic 
markets and this suppressed the development of free and fair competition in 
international air transportation.
Briefly it can be stated that, the demise of the nationality principle will be the 
end of the restrictive system of Chicago. The doctrine of cabotage would be vague 
with any such decision of de-nationalisation and the sovereignty-centred protectionist 
philosophy will lose its two pillars. However the first condition of ‘de­
nationalisation’ attempt is to redefine the meaning o f ‘national interest’ in the context 
of air transportation.''^
2.5.5. The Foundation of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO)
The Chicago Conference was not without accomplishment in regards of 
establishing a multilateral organisation. ICAO was established to coordinate technical
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and operational standards in civil aviation such as navigation aides and techniques, 
whether reporting, equipment and crew certification. At the insisting of the United 
States, ICAO was limited to an advisory and consultative role to an extent that its 
recommendations were subjected to the· approval of the governments.'*^
Although one of its objectives was to meet the needs of the peoples of the world 
for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport, ICAO has never become 
involved with the economic matters of the air transport industry and left these matters 
to bilateral negotiations.
The importance of ICAO has gone parallel with the expansion of the 
international air transport and, thus, the increased requirement for coordination of the 
international air transport regulation.'*’ Some commentators assert that, ICAO is the 
only organisation to foster the development of a multilateral economic regime of 
international civil aviation. However it appears that, at least for the foreseeable 
future, until the dissolution of the bilateral system, ICAO will continue its role of 
being a forum for multilateral discussion of the states on non-economic air traffic 
issues.
2.6. The Chicago System versus Globalisation:
Evidently the premises of the international air transport system formulated in 
Chicago Convention, are in conflict with the premises of globalisation. The closed 
system of Chicago is based on protectionist conceptions of sovereignty, nationality 
and cabotage whereas globalisation is grounded firmly on concepts of international
48free trade, competition and consumer choice.
The deregulation and liberalisation attempts of United States and European 
Union will be far away from reaching the goal without the dissolution of these three 
pillars of the Chicago system. However as seen in the Uruguay Round and the recent
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free trade agreements between Canada and United States, states do not actually wish 
to establish a free international air transport system.
2.7. The General Characteristics of Bilateral Air Agreements
2.7.1. The content and legal characteristics
Bilateral air service agreements are international trade agreements in which the 
governmental aviation authorities of two nations establish a regulatory mechanism for 
the performance of commercial services between their respective territories, save for 
cabotage services, and beyond, in cases of the exchange of fifth freedom.''^
The pivotal concern of states in negotiations is to exchange of hard rights 
defined as, designation of airlines, route selection^ capacity and frequency controls, 
and pricing rules. Each of the provision are discussed in detail before the 
conclusion of the agreement.
Soft rights including, opportunities for selling and marketing, ground handling, 
taxation, customs duties, employment and expatriate personnel, are partially covered 
by the provisions of Chicago Convention and the ICAO standards. However 
considerable number of rights are subject to bilateral agreements especially the recent 
matters of access to computer reservation systems, authorisation of code-sharing 
arrangements and equal treatment of non-national airlines in supply and operation of 
airport slots, gates and terminal services, in order to avoid possible uncertainties and 
to overcome national restrictive regulations.^^
2.7.2 The Negotiating Weapons
Each state seeks to protect its national air transport industry, through narrowing 
the operation opportunities of the foreign airlines within their market. On the other 
hand, they endeavour harshly to maximise the benefit of their national commercial air 
services in the international civil aviation market. Therefore the goals of states are
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opposed to and in conflict with each other.B ilateral agreements represents a 
comprise between the claims of both parties, albeit one party is less satisfied from the 
result.
States use every kind of instruments to strengthen their bargaining positions at 
the negotiations.
The size of the national territory, its respective situation in terms of to other 
states and main traffic routes, the value of ‘hubs’, airports that have been made large 
centres of on-line connecting traffic by the airlines concerned, have significant 
contribution to the state’s competitive and bargaining strength.^^
Considering solely the geographical features, the size of the national territory 
and the location of the state have strong implications over its bargaining leverage of 
states.
States with extensive territories, such as Soviet Union, Canada, Brazil and 
United States, have more cards to play in bilateral negotiations regarding the 
distances to be flown over its territory in transit or to inland designations and the 
number of the international airports.
From that ‘large territory’ standpoint, the smaller countries appear to be put at 
the disadvantaged side. However, some of the small countries such as Ireland, 
Portugal, Iceland and Netherlands located on major international air highways 
affording technical facilities on long distance routes, have got important triumph 
cards during the negotiations.
On the other hand, although the geographical factors still have weight in the 
competitive positions of some countries such as Britain, located in the centre of 
transatlantic routes, most of the countries subjected their bargaining strength solely
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on geographical factors lost their position within the dynamism of aviation industry 
which invented very long range jets qualified to operate non-stop commercial flights.
In that respect, geographical factors today get efficiency with the ability of 
states to develop an extensive network of international gateways and establishing 
efficient hubs. Given the volume of the traffic and the territorial size, larger states 
may derive a considerable advantage from a developed network of international 
gateways and thus, institute efficient hubs.^^
Additionally, the size of the national markets, the competitive strength of 
airlines, the stage of technological development, the characteristics of countries such 
as being business and tourism centres, as well as other non-aviation factors have 
considerable weight on the bargaining leverage of states at the bilateral negotiations.
Having discussed the negotiating weapons of states, a general rule can be 
concluded that the stronger states, in terms of its size of territory, location, 
international gateways and the value of hubs, tend to act more restrictively at the 
exchange of routes and traffic rights as long as the other party declines to offer 
comparable benefits.
The vast national and international air transport market added to all other 
factors discussed above, provided a great bargaining leverage for the United States in 
dealing with other countries and empowered the U.S. to impose its aviation policy in 
bilateral agreements even though the other parties were unwilling to accept its 
conditions. Moreover, it enabled United States to secure agreements advantageous to 
itself in such a way that its carriers has gotten the right to board passengers at the 
designation cities in Europe for onward transit to other points in Europe whereas 
comparable rights has been restrained in U.S. because of the cabotage and nationality 
restrictions.
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The attitude of United States, in fact consistent with its general trade mentality 
as expressed by the chairman of United States Federal Maritime Commission in 
1977, “To participate in the U.S. foreign trades is a privilege and not a right”.
As to improve their bargaining position and counterbalance the advantaged 
positions of the stronger partners in international air transport negotiations, smaller 
and medium market countries tend to come together to establish geographical 
regional blocs as a defensive system.
In conclusion, it has to be noticed that the determining factors of the bargaining 
strength of states are subject to changeable factors of technology, economic and 
political balances, that makes the international civil aviation system flexible and 
unpredictable.^^
2.8. The Age of Bilateralism
The months immediately concluding the Chicago Convention, Britain 
postulating, ‘regulated operation’, and United States urging, ‘unrestricted 
competition’, launched an aggressive competition against each other. The triumph 
card of Britain was that of its strategic location along the transatlantic routes and its 
control of imperial transit points albeit its weakness in equipment and technology 
compared to United States.
On the other side. United States through supplying modern aircraft and offering 
a huge size of air market was in a more advantageous position. The United States 
entered into a series of liberal bilateral agreements involving the fifth freedom rights 
with Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, 
directed extensively to encircle Britain and to coerce it into accepting the American 
position. As observed in subsequent years, the divide and conquer policy had 
successfully been applied by U.S. in preventing the formation of joint actions
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organised in Europe or in other places of world. The essence of this policy is to 
reward individual concessions in order to imitate the others to enter similar bilateral 
agreements. The, tactic of United States can be defined as, a carrot-and-stick tactic to 
persuade the others to join in the liberalisation drive.^° The desire of countries, 
particularly European States, to have their airlines serve points in the U.S., spurred 
the U.S. encirclement strategy. In the absence of coordinated action, U.S. 
successfully combined the rights obtained from the different bilaterals and won 
privileged commercial rights for American carriers within and beyond Europe. The 
bilateral system reinforced the implementation of forceful diplomacy.
The only course open for the advance of aviation was to be achieved through 
the reconcilement of the respective American and British aviation policies and that 
had been accomplished with the meet of both states at Bermuda in 1946.
2.8.1 Bermuda I: ‘Magna Carta of International Aviation’^^
The Air Services Agreement between United States and United Kingdom was 
important not just because of its representation of a compromise between the 
philosophies of two countries but also its tribute place in international civil aviation 
in virtue of being a prototype model in regards of the exchange of traffic rights for the 
subsequent bilateral agreements. Added to, its momentousness in international civil 
aviation system, the liberal character of the agreement led it to be called as the, 
‘Magna Carta of international aviation’.
The two leading aviation powers were prepared to make concessions to resolve 
the differences between themselves regarding routes, tariffs and capacity.
In regards of capacity, which was the essence of the conflicts. United Kingdom 
abandoned its insistence on the prior planing of route capacities, as 50/50,and 
recognised the freedom of the designated carriers to determine their frequency on a
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given route, subject to only to an ‘ex post facto ’ review by the aeronautical authorities 
of the Contracting States. However, the free determination of capacity by the carriers 
was not exempted from the government control since the Paragraph 4 and 9 of the 
Final Act have brought a hidden predetermination possibility for the capacity.
The Paragraph 4 of the Final Act promoted a system based on the fair and equal 
opportunity for the carriers of two nations to the operate over the designated routes. 
In conjunction with that principle. Paragraph 9 brought the requirement of regular 
and frequent consultation between respective aeronautical authorities. So, a flexible 
and liberal determination process for capacity has established, but the authority of 
government has not challenged with the ex post facto condition that required 
consultation between national authorities. The government approval was required for 
the implementation of the determined capacity rules, even though it was not written 
as a rule.
In exchange of the Britain’s concession. United States retreated from its earlier 
opposition to any form of international regulation of fares by agreeing to delegate 
primary fare-setting responsibility to the International Air Transport Association, 
lATA, subject to the approval of both governments, named as the ‘double approval’ 
system.^^ Accordingly, fares and rates would be negotiated and determined by the 
designated air carriers in the tariff conferences of the lATA, yet the results should be 
submitted and approved by the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Parties. 
The delegation of lATA in Bermuda agreement as the ratemaking machinery 
endorsed a system o f ‘achieving multilateralism through bilateralism’.
With regards to the route selection and designation of carriers, the Bermuda 
agreement might be defined as liberal since the Contracting Parties granted each other 
the right to designate one or more airline to perform regular international air services
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between or beyond the Contracting Sta tes .The multiple designation of air carriers 
to the agreed specific routes was consistent with the American liberal stand.
In conclusion, it is to be said that the subsequent bilateral agreements have 
adopted the pattern of the Bermuda I agreement and as one commentator indicated, 
“This pattern was a combination of bilateralism and multilateralism, which laid the 
foundation for a checks and balances system”.
The establishment of lATA ratemaking machinery for the determination of 
international tariffs spurred the development of a multilateral system in respect to 
pricing. Additionally a liberal and flexible system has formed for the determination of 
capacity, route selection and designation of the carriers.
On the other hand, Bermuda I strengthen the role of the governments in the 
formulation of international civil aviation policy. It did not challenge the government 
intervention in capacity, pricing and route selection processes. The capacity rates 
would be discussed at the regular consultation of the respective aeronautical 
authorities and the agreed tariffs between air carriers at lATA conferences would 
require the final approval of the two contracting governments. Also the governments 
would designate the carriers which has been effectively and substantially owned by 
the nationals.
In fact, the reason why the provisions have involved both liberal and protective 
connotations was because of the accommodation of the two opposite positions,
67American expansionism and British protectionism at the same regulatory formula.
2.8.2 The Golden Age betv/een 1946-1962 and Its Dismantle in 1963-1972
The growth of the gross national product in western states and the increase in 
the volume global world exchanges added to the rapid technological progress 
between 1946 and 1962, the average annual growth rate of air traffic in world had
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reached to 20% and that provided a fertile ground for the spread of the liberal and 
flexible regulatory principles of Bermuda all around the world.^®
During the fifties the economic recovery of European states had performed by 
the American aids, while their security needs were carried out by the American 
security spending provided through NATO. The economic and security dependence 
of European countries provided U.S. to obtain fifth freedom rights both from these 
states and their post-colonies, vast zones of Africa and Middle East, where their 
sphere of influence was still evident. Moreover, the newly independent states entered 
into bilateral agreements with United Sates were technologically and economically 
incapable to develop their own civil aviation industry as well as inexperienced of 
their own possibilities for using reciprocal rights.^^ The U.S. dominancy was also 
evident in ICAO and lATA. Bilateral system spurred U.S. to ends.
However, the situation began to change with the coming of 1960s. The failure 
of airlines in reaching an agreement at the 1962 lATA Traffic Conference displayed 
that the Chicago-Bermuda I system was loosening. The period between 1962-1978 
Bermuda system encountered severe internal and external shocks, which ended with 
the deregulation act of United States. The lATA’s role of tariff setting began to 
weaken as a result of the structural changes in the industry involving new entries of 
non-IATA charter services from developed countries and new entries of airlines from 
developing countries as well as the increasing U.S. actions designed to undermine the 
lATA’s fare-setting function. The newly independent Third World States attempted 
to transform the functioning of ICAO to an economic regulatory body. Although they 
failed to establish of a multilateral regulatory mechanism, they turned to be more
70conscious and protective in bilateral negotiotions.
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The period between 1962-1978 is divided into two phrases, the first involves 
years between 1962-1970 when the internal factors prompted for change and the 
second involves 1971-1978 when the external factors stimulated change.
2.8.3 Internal Developments of 1962-1970: The First Challenge to the
System
The stability of the Bermuda I lATA fare setting system was first challenged in 
1962 when the airlines failed to reach an agreement in the Traffic Conference of 
lATA. Two reasons were evident for this creaking in lATA fare setting system. First 
of all, the share of the state owned air carriers in' the total air traffic within the intra- 
European market and at the transatlantic routes had expanded, particularly after the 
launch of Vietnam War, which made U.S. to allocate considerable portion of its 
aviation industry to the war.
The second challenging factor was of the entry of the newly independent Third 
World States into the Bermuda I lATA system. These states at first knew little about 
their role in international civil aviation, hence devoted their sources to strengthen 
their national airline industry. However, the consciousness of these states in regards 
of the implications of Bermuda type agreements and the lATA fare setting 
mechanism awakened by the early sixties. A new form of nationalist-protectionist air 
transport policies emerged in these years in such a way that carrying the flag of state 
had equalised with getting international recognition and prestige.
Although the I AT A seemed as the organisation of the trade association of 
international airlines nearly all of the member airlines were state owned thus the air 
transport policies of the states whether protectionist or liberal directly reflected to the 
tariff setting process. The divergent aviation policies some of which advocating open 
rate system while the others urging for protectionist measures forestalled the sense of
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solidarity for the settlement of tariffs through lATA machinery. The former members 
deliberately performed aggressive policy towards the new competitors and the 
uneasiness in the organisation reached to an untenable level.^^
On the other hand, the requirement of unanimity rule in the process of fare 
determination gave veto power to all airlines in I AT A. Moreover, that agreed fares 
were subject to the approval of the states and some states did actually exercise their 
right of disapproval from time to time such as the disapproval of certain transatlantic 
fares by the United States settled in lATA in 1963.^^
The crisis within the lATA and Bermuda I system aggravated with the 
enormous rise in the number of charter flights that in turn led the abatement of the 
international scheduled airlines in the market and generated price wars between 
scheduled air services and charter operations.
2.8.3.I. The Progress of Non-Scheduled Air Services 
During the sixties the market of the international air services expanded 
tremendously as a consequence of the ‘progress of the mass long-haul tourism’ and 
the recovery of European market.
In fact a more flexible system was required for the seasonal demands in air 
travel. This need successfully met by the non-scheduled air services and the legal 
vacuum left by the Chicago Convention helped this process. Indeed, the aim of the 
non-scheduled airlines was to escape from the lengthy bureaucratic process of the 
bilateral negotiations and the long-lasting lATA fare setting Conferences. As long as 
the operations of charters were involving local points, there was no requirement for a 
comprehensive exchange of traffic rights and no need to base them on reciprocity 
principle.
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Moreover the countries receiving tourists were likely to access the charter 
flights to certain points in the country as long as they have gotten foreign currency
........- Consequently-some· states granted liberal rights to charter companies-and-gave
unilateral concessions while keeping the restrictive attitude towards the scheduled air 
services.
Between 1962 and 1972, the share of the total air traffic taken by non- 
scheduled air carriers blew up from 2% to 19.9%.^^
In response, scheduled air services introduced promotional fares directed to 
capture the charter prices. As a precedent, in 1960, 88% passengers travelling on 
North Atlantic route paid normal published fare for the scheduled air services. 
Nevertheless in 1973, 75% of those passengers travelled by paying promotional 
fares.
The price wars between the scheduled and non-scheduled services aggravated 
in the late sixties, as a result of the excess capacity because of the introduction jumbo 
jets. The reduction in the cost because of the added seats, these carriers offered lower 
fares to passengers. Most of the airline companies engaging in charter or scheduled 
services employed their jumbo jets on the high traffic density routes and the 
competition between the two services turned into price wars. Nevertheless, due to the 
cumbersome of lATA machinery, manoeuvre potentiality of the scheduled services
77was not high enough to cope with the flexible regulation of charter services.
Given the tremendous market share of the scheduled air services operating 
within and beyond the country, the price wars, impaired mostly the U.S. scheduled 
air market. The Civil Aviation Board (CAB) of United States felt compelled to 
preserve the competitive positions of scheduled airlines and declared that it reserved
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all rights of refusing to approve of fares set by lATA. It actually refused to endorse 
the fares in 1963 in regardless of precipitating a major aviation crisis.’^
The thesis of U.S. was that if the market is not to be shared between the ones 
who pay the cost of the I AT A system, then a more competitive system should be 
established between the ones playing equally.
2.8.4. The External Developments of 1971-1978: The Second Challenge 
In the early 1970s, as a result of the pressure of external developments came in 
the form of monetary instability, inflation, shortage of oil and the corresponding 
increase in the production of cost, world wide economic recession and 
Eurostagnation, the lATA ratemaking machinery became increasingly ineffective on 
the determination of fares and the Bermuda I system had crumbled in practice. In fact 
the main reason of the weakening of the lATA was that of the controversial recovery 
of United States in mid-seventies in contrast to Europe. Notwithstanding the decline 
of its total share in world traffic in the first half of the seventies, with the spur of 
combined factors the U.S. airlines once again renewed vigour in international civil 
aviation.
First of all United States was not dependent to the oil of OPEC countries as 
much as its European allies, secondly the end of the war in Vietnam gave U.S. the 
opportunity to convert its long-range and wide-bodied aircrafts to civilian purposes 
and got an important portion of European market coincidently at the time when the 
aviation in Europe was in recession due to the shortages of aviation fuel and the 
increased cost. Thirdly, the increased demand in transpacific route by the emergence 
of Japan as an economic superpower and the transpacific population migration. 
Additionally, the emergence of new markets in late-seventies in Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and subsequently Malaysia and Thailand opened new
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gateways for the American air carriers. In fact all these external factors allowed the 
growth of the aviation market of United States in markets of transatlantic, Europe, 
between Europe and Far East, and in the transpacific.
On the other side, civil aviation industry in Europe was in crisis. The first 
major challenge to the aviation industry of Europe came with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. The Bermuda I regulatory system was heavily dependent on 
a stabile exchange rate system and disparities in the monetary system and 
unpredictable monetary variations would naturally block the price negotiations in 
lATA and jeopardise the profitability of operations of scheduled air services. The 
already reduced profits of scheduled airlines, due to the increase in charter flights, 
overcapacity and tariff wars, brought down considerably with the incredible rise of 
the oil prices and the corresponding inflation which diminished the purchasing power 
of the population and slowed down the transport of both passenger and goods 
worldwide.
Moreover, the purchase of carriers was to be done by U.S. dollars and the most 
of the developing countries as well as most of the European States encountered with 
unfortunate debts.
So, the airline industry in Europe and developing countries were in struggle to 
come over the extreme difficulties while American airlines were living the boom. 
The clash of this two farthest positions at the end gave way to a new regulatory 
system, characterised with restriction, called as the Bermuda II.
2.8.5 Bermuda II: A Road to U.S. Deregulation Act
From 1975 onwards, the Bermuda I regulatory system become increasingly 
unattainable for the former Bermuda partners. The augmented tension between U.S. 
and UK immediately required a fundamental revision of the former agreement.
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Although the Bermuda II agreement signed in 1977, the process actually 
originated in 1975, with a Declaration of President Ford proclaiming that United 
States would no more comply with the capacity controls based on equal division of 
market shares in the wake of the 1973 oil crises. Moreover, United States explicitly 
stated its intendment of forming a system grounded on free competition rather than 
managed competition. Ironically however, it was the United States who resisted the 
entry of Concorde into its market in order not to damage the competitive positions of 
American airlines. Perhaps utilising non-trade measures were an easy way of 
camouflaging the protectionism on specific issues when faced with stiffer 
competition.
In response to the U.S. declaration. United Kingdom denounced the Bermuda I 
agreement in 1976.
The negotiations between the two former bilateral partners and close allies 
launched in an extremely negative atmosphere and continued with increasingly 
growing tension, sometimes turning into explicit quarrels not only at the level of 
governments but also at the level of media and public prompting crisis through 
urging to take economic actions against each other. The confrontation between two 
allies reached to a point to close up the air services operating between the two 
countries.
Unlike the Bermuda I, negotiators of two countries bargained the concrete 
issues rather than theories.*' United Kingdom based its urges on ‘fair competition’ 
instead of ‘free competition’ and accordingly demanded an equal share of 
transatlantic traffic, 50/50 capacity division, a larger number of gateways into the 
United States, an institutionalisation of some concerted scheduling operations on the
5?9North Atlantic, predetermination of capacity and removal of fifth freedom rights.
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Interestingly, for the first time a state asked for the exact implementation of the ‘fair 
and equal’ competition, which had been written in all previous agreements.
Finally a compromise had reached on July 23, 1977. Accordingly, United 
Kingdom obtained more gateways into United States and also succeeded in limiting 
the designation by each side of scheduled services between the American gateways 
and its own airports.
Beyond the American and British mutual concessions, the Bermuda II 
agreement was important in virtue of its general restrictive and protectionist 
character prepared for the new international aviation system.
The exclusive restrictive provision of Bermuda I, establishing a ‘double 
approval’ pricing system, remained same in Bermuda II, whereas in the areas of 
capacity, route and designation that were quite liberal in Bermuda I agreement, the 
Bermuda II adopted very restrictive regulations. First of all, the ex post facto capacity 
determination principle transformed to a priori regulation, required the governments 
to exchange the operating programs of their airlines six months ahead of each season 
of operation. Secondly, the multiple designation of air carriers acknowledged in 
Bermuda I, altered to single designation on North Atlantic routes except for two 
routes where multiple designation was permitted.
The reversal of liberalism in Bermuda II, had important consequences in the 
domestic and international aviation policy of U.S. At the outset, it accelerated the 
deregulation movement of domestic airline industry under the Carter administration, 
which had started up in mid-seventies under President Gerard Ford. Secondly, the 
U.S. once again put the ‘divide and combine’ invasion policy into use as to preempt 
Bermuda II to become a model for the future bilateral agreements.
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2.9. A Special Conference in ICAO: Developing Countries Become Aware
The increasing challenges of U.S. towards the lATA’s fare-setting function and 
its attempts to export liberal motions to other states, made the developing states to 
move towards multilateral gatherings. The motivation behind these moves was that 
to forestall the free play of economic forces within international civil aviation in 
order not to weaken their position under a system of unrestricted competition, which 
would eliminate their national airlines from the game.^^
In that regard, the developing countries sought to reinforce multilateral 
arrangements to preclude the unilateral attempts of U.S. The structural construction 
and the decision-making system in the lATA, where the largest carriers dominate, 
and the continues challenges of U.S. made the developing states to turn to ICAO.
At the Special Air Transport Conference in April 1977, one hundred and two 
countries met to discuss the economic regulation of air transport in a changing 
wo rid. The main topics of the Conference was as such, the order economic growth 
of internal air transport, the present deregulation moves, divergence between 
scheduled and non-scheduled flights, revision of their definitions, harmonisation of 
the system and the adoption of the tariff agreements.However the Conference 
failed to go beyond the recommendation of regulation rather than deregulation. The 
newly emerged liberalisation trends in the industrialised world compensated the 
attempts of developing countries for a regulated system under the control of ICAO. 
However these liberal trends did not intended to transform the system to a new 
competitive system.
The failure of multilateral attempts stimulated bilateral and regional 
arrangements.
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CHAPTER in
DEREGULATION, LIBERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION:
THREE MODELS OF CHANGE
S.l.The U.S. Airline Deregulation
The restrictive provisions of the Bermuda II agreement and the unwillingness 
of the states in transforming the thirty years old regulatory system urged U.S. to take 
revolutionary measures both in domestic and international aviation politics. The 
American Congress decided to deregulate the domestic air transport market in 1978, 
which in practice had been started in mid 1970s. Besides, it initiated “open skies” 
policy to export the domestic deregulation model to the international community.
The basic premise of deregulation in general sense is the elimination of 
government induced economic controls to allow the free play of market forces, 
subject only to enforcement of anti-monopoly and consumer protection laws.' 
Converting that definition to the air transport, deregulation means withdrawing a
priori government interference from economic control over market entry and exit,
2prices, capacity, consolidation and profitability at all civil aviation levels.
Given the highly protected airline industry of other countries, the U.S. 
attempts, as expectably brought about source of friction between its bilateral 
partners. Additionally, the absence of a multilaterally accepted regime for the 
exchange of economic rights in air transport made U.S. to export its deregulatoiy 
policies through the only open course of bilateral agreements. The ‘open skies’ 
policy of U.S. intended to export the premises of deregulation including, unrestricted 
competition, low prices and consumer choice, free determination of airlines in 
determining the variety, quality and the price of the air transportation services and 
the employment of anti-trust laws against monopolistic industry concentration.''
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In conjuncture with its urge for more competition, U.S. launched an assault on 
the ratemaking mechanism of lATA, to give an end to the cartel-like fare-setting 
style of the organisation, which distinguishes the individual competitive strength of 
the airlines.
In sum, the U.S. deregulation of airlines in 1978 was a unilateral act actuated 
against all regulatory mechanisms on both domestic and international levels, 
consisted of bilateral agreements and multilateral arrangement, lATA. Naturally, it 
had repercussions at all level.
3.2. The U.S. Airline Deregulation: ‘Big Bang’ in Theory, Incremental at
Work
Practically, the airline deregulation had been under way in U.S. domestic 
market since October 1975, the date of the first deregulation bill was submitted to 
Congress by the Republican President of President Gerald R. Ford."* Apparent since 
mid-1970s, the regulatory structure of the airline industry in U.S. was in deficiency 
to ensure the coherence between law and practice. A new legislation was needed to 
adjust the system to the massive growth of airline industry in recent years.
In such kind of a reform-required situations, governments become hard up for 
choosing the degree of the initiated reforms. The reform strategies of the states might 
be examined through searching two models even though they failed to be 
implemented in pure form. The first one is at the extreme side advocating a rapid and 
radical change referred as ‘Big Bang’ type, and the other one is at the moderate side 
advocating a staggered way of adjustment through phased series of incremental 
regulatory reforms.^
The proponents of the Big Bange type change favour a sudden comprehensive 
change in the regulatory structure of the defined industry in order to get rapid results.
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in the way of reaching the desired level of the economic welfare. Therefore the Big 
Bang approach is based on the doctrine of ‘shock therapy’. On the contrary the 
incremental type of adjustments provides progressive way of liberalisation in which 
pre-planned serials take time to be materialised in order to eliminate major upsets.^' 
In that sense, incrementalism promises a reform strategy based on the idea of 
‘learning-by doing’, which provides the opportunity for the policy makers and the 
affected group to adjust their policies to the information acquired through 
experiences.
Should a comparison be made between the two philosophies, it can be 
concluded that the long-term effect of both results· in same, while strong disparities 
exist in their short-term consequences. The initial costs of Big Bang approach to the 
industry in short-term are much higher than an incremental way,of conducting.
In such kind of sectors where the initial costs are respectively high, especially 
due to the utilisation of the high technology, shock treatment approach renders 
considerable adverse implications even to an extent of encouraging oligopoly or 
monopoly kind of formations within the industry. Given that shortcomings of the Big 
Bang approach, aviation industry would be the last to be reformed through such 
treatment.
The liberalisation movement of the air transport industry has started up with 
the American deregulation act and then expanded through Europe and the world. In 
present the outcome effects of the U.S. deregulation and the liberalisation movement 
in European Union is more or less same. However, the American act resembles the 
Big Bang approach while the liberalisation movement of EU is in like manner of the 
incremental kind of structuring.
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As a matter of fact, the U.S. reforms on aviation were not totally a Big Bang 
type since it did not immediately turned the economic regulation into free market, 
but on the other hand, it was a Big Bang in a sense that a single act radically changed 
the way the domestic passenger aviation market was regulated/
The American Congress well knew that an instantaneous change in regulation 
of air transport would damage the industry. Although the proclamation of the 1978 
Deregulation Act sounded as a shock therapy, it envisaged a time schedule for the 
execution of the reforms. A combination of forces made the Congress to initiate such 
kind of radical approach.
First of all, since mid-1970s there had been a de facto relaxation of regulatory 
controls corresponding to the growth of air transport market both internally and 
externally. The U.S. aviation industry was desirous to intensify its market share both 
within the internal and external market through reducing regulatory barriers and 
inducing more competition. Albeit, let alone these liberalisation demands thrown out 
for consideration for the last five years, the Bermuda II agreement renounced the 
reasonable provisions of Bermuda I agreement and brought a rigid restrictive system 
for international air transportation. As Senate Commerce Committee Chairman 
Howard Cannon remarked in the aftermath of the conclusion of Bermuda II, it was 
“the greatest step backward in forty years of attempting to bring market-oriented 
competition to international aviation”.*
The only course open for U.S. to forestall the agreement becoming a model in 
international system was to induce a very strong international policy having 
commanding impact over all states including United Kingdom. Deregulation of the 
domestic air transport would be the first and the most important step because it 
would demonstrate the profits of deregulation. What U.S. intended at that stage was
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to prompt the other states to deregulate their domestic aviation in accordance with 
the U.S. deregulation model. However a stimulus was needed for that stage of 
encouragement. The stimulus was named as ‘open skies policy’, which aimed to 
force the states to liberalise their domestic and international aviation regulatory 
systems in return of increased market access to the U.S. market. However, what 
United States referred as ‘stimulus’, was interpreted as ‘interventionalism’ in other 
parts of the world. Consequently, two kind of reactions had emerged. The developed 
states having robust aviation markets proceeded down the path of liberalisation 
whereas the developing states having weaker markets inclined to take protective 
measures either individually or regionally.
The second reason why U.S. felt itself compelled to initiate a radical reform 
strategy was that of the public support and the sensitivity of the White House to the 
issue. The public support behind deregulation can be divided into two as positive and 
negative. At the positive side, given the price-elastic character of aviation indu.stry, 
people were in favour of the full application of the unregulated price competition that 
would reduce the fares. While this positive spur was related to the aviation itself, the 
negative spur behind deregulation corresponded to the political conjunctions of that 
time. Briefly stating, there was an increasing mass psychology of antagonism toward 
government, provoked on the right by the Great Society and the growth of 
government spending and taxation and on the left by Watergate and the war in 
Vietnam.^ Therefore a radical approach of abandoning the economic regulatory 
power of government control over the industry seemed sound.
3.3. The Airline Deregulation of 1978
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, introduced two radical shifts on issues 
that base the internal and external aviation policies. In that sense a Big Bang type
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approach has put into way on issues concerning the ‘public utility’ and the ‘equality 
of opportunities’.
1. From Public Utility’ towards ‘Consumer Choice’: A radical transition from the 
classic public welfare school of transportation, advocating a regulated competition, 
to ‘consumer choice’ philosophy favour in ‘maximum reliance on market 
competitive forces’. In that context “the heavy hand of CAB economic regulation 
would be replaced by the creative hand of carrier management” which would allow 
the carrier to determine the quality, variety and price of air services in accordance 
with public demand as well as providing the opportunity to consumers to make their 
free choices.^'
2. From ‘Equality of Opportunity’ to ‘Opportunity of Comparable Magnitude’: A 
radical change in the international aviation policy has done through transforming the 
‘equality’ principle to ‘comparable’. Considering the huge size of domestic market 
and numerous mega-hubs no comparable rights could be offered to U.S. carriers on 
other markets. Moreover, the highly subsidised foreign carriers harm the competitive 
strength of the non-subsidised U.S. carriers in international markets. In that sense, 
instead of exchanging equal rights, U.S. would to conclude ‘a balanced arrangement 
but not necessarily an identical exchange’. I n  other words, U.S. would not any
1 O
more “seek competitive advantage instead dwell on competitive equity”.
The Congress approved the radical change of the U.S. approaches regarding 
two issues, however the Congress itself did not have “the appetite for a sudden 
Smithian lunch to a free market”.^ “* In fact what the U.S. intended was to lay the 
source of a future profound change. In that sense an incremental way of changing has 
indicated both in domestic and international policies. This became apparent in its 
‘Small Community Program” guaranteeing subsidised air services to certain cities
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where no competitive benefit exist for the operation of air carriers. Moreover, it did 
not planned the immediate abolition of CAB and all its works. Additionally, albeit 
its enforcement for the exhaustion of traditional bilateralism, the open skies policy of 
U.S. refused to contemplate liberalisation of the cabotage and nationality principles, 
the premises of the Chicago system.
In that regard, the deregulation engaged in U.S. for civil aviation is not a 
deregulation in classical meaning in the view of the fact that it did not have the 
intention to turn the air transportation into a normal economic activity, treating 
airlines as business enterprises under national business.
It is worth to examine the changes in domestic and international air transport 
policy of U.S. attained by the Deregulation Act and to criticise their consequences.
3.4. The Sunset of CAB and the Predecessor of DOT
The legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Board, CAB, commenced with 
the Civil Aeronautics of 1938 and the followed up by Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 
The Congress sought to institute a regulatory structure in such kind of a public utility 
industry in order to enhance economic stability and avoid excessive competition, 
thereby to ensure the sound economic growth and development of air 
transportation.
Nevertheless after forty years of enormous growth in air transport industry, the 
regulatory mechanism began to turn against the benefit of the airline industry and the 
public. Briefly stating the basic regulatory areas of CAB,
Market Entry: The designation of the specific carrier on certain route, the 
decision of the community to be served and the selection of routes to be flown were 
prescribed by the CAB.^* The mere importance, however, was to get the certificate of 
“public convenience and necessity”, from CAB, before asking its approval for
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operation on one route selected by the CAB itself. The broad authority of the Board 
on market entry had been the main obstacle for the development of competition in air 
transport industry until 1978. In the forty-year history of the agency none of a new 
carrier got the right to operate on a major routes.'^ Moreover, the Board disallowed 
the entry of all carriers on routes that already had two or more carriers. These 
certificated carriers were mostly the ones, who had received certificates in 1938 for 
the routes they still serving in 1978, exactly suited to the specification of 
‘grandfather syndrome’ referred as by Brian Havel.
Rate-Authority: Although the Board had no power to determine the fares, it had 
numerous supervisory and suspensory powers to rectify the fares in case it found 
‘unjust and unreasonable’. F r o m  the end of 1960s to date of deregulation, 
regardless to which route has served, all the fares had standardised at a level. 
Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, and the fares above that level rejected in due 
course of being excessive and those below that level rejected for being 
uneconomically low. Paradoxically, starting from the Chicago Convention, it was the 
United States who continuously insisted on the settlement of a international 
competitive system, especially in respect to the free determination of fare setting. 
However, it was also the U.S. whose domestic system was embedded on a non-price 
competition in which only the utilised services, such as flight frequency, scheduling, 
air plane equipment, was competing.^^
Antitrust Authority: With respect to anti-trust authority, the Board mainly dealt 
with the immunisation of the intercarrier mergers and agreements that might violate 
the U.S. antitrust laws. Intercarrier mergers and agreements were to be approved by 
the Board in accordance with the prerequisite of being consistent with the public 
interest. Had the antitrust authority of CAB been executed by the national antitrust
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law, public would have been more benefited in virtue of receiving the best service at 
lower prices. Contrary to that there was no price beneficiaiy competition system in 
air transport industry and thus the execution of antitrust law was nothing more than a 
process of haggle between the carriers and the CAB for the disposition of route, fare 
and antitrust exemption applications.
There were no state owned or subsidised airline companies in U.S. as opposed 
to the other states, yet it was under the responsibility of the CAB to provide the 
maintenance of the industry, preempt bankruptcies and to subsidise the industry in an 
indirect manner. Contradicting with the doctrine of the Supreme Court, CAB was 
‘protecting the competitors, not the competition’.
The first popular critique to the existing regulatory system came with the 
Kennedy Report in 1976, arguing how the CAB system of regulation was preventing 
competition in such a potentially high competitive industry. The Report 
recommended a reformation of the Board instead of calling for its abolition. In that 
sense it was to be considered as a regulatory reform, modest improvement of 
regulatory process, rather than deregulation.^^
The deregulatory reform of airlines became the official policy when the 
President Carter signed into law the Airline Deregulation Act, ADA, which proposed 
a gradual abolition of the airline industry’s regulatory incubator, CAB, and a gradual 
shift in the domestic and international policy.
The deregulation act sought to redistribute the industry wealth from the airlines 
to consumer and to strength the industry by instituting free market economy, which 
would reduce the prices while filling the unused capacity for the benefit of airlines.
In that context, with respect to entry, the certificate of CAB continued to be 
required yet the route access was now opened to any carrier that could show itself
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‘fit, willing and able’ to perform the requested transportation.The route authority 
of CAB was forced to sunset on December 31, 1981. Secondly, in regards of fare 
setting, the priori authority of the Board on deciding whether the fare was ‘unjust or 
unreasonable’ abolished and ‘a standard industry fare level’ established, which was 
much more flexible. The sunset provisions of ADA designed for termination of the 
fare setting authority of CAB envisaged the date of January 1, 1983. All the other 
authorities of CAB transformed to Department of Transportation with a single 
exception, which was the antitrust law. Actually, what the ADA re*cognised the 
establishment of potential and actual competition amongst the airlines would be 
subject to the residual control of the government over mergers and anti-competitive 
practices. However, since the aim of the deregulation was to turn the air 
transportation into a normal economic activity, the Department of Justice, DOJ, 
should have been the authority in the application of the national antitrust laws. Two 
phases had foreseen for that transformation. At the outset, merger approval authority 
was transferred to DOT on January 1985 and then on January 1, 1989 DOT 
transferred its antitrust authority to DOJ and thus all proposed airline mergers and 
agreements became subject to the general antitrust laws.
3.5. Repercussions of Deregulation
The CAB regime had been settled on the beneficiary of the airlines, not for 
consumers’, therefore, it allocated all of its sources for the immunisation of the 
airlines from antitrust challenge and for the prevention of bankruptcies.
Deregulation Act tried to equalise the consumer benefits with the proficiency 
of the airlines. The principal benefits of airline deregulation were grasped to be 
reduced costs to the industry, free will of entry and leave from the markets, lower 
fares and more frequent services for the consumers.
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In the aftermath of the deregulation the fares really came down and the 
consumer applauded the new regime. However, the reversal reverberation of the 
deregulation first began to be scanned between airlines and then within the 
passengers. The main reason was the oligopoly character of the airline industry, 
which had been omitted in the ADA. Competition between the airlines would have 
been at the benefit of the consumers unless the airlines had been agreed within 
themselves for the prices and frequency. At the outset of the deregulation, since no 
agreement had been made between the airlines, an intense competition began 
between the large incumbent airlines. The prices fell down immediately and most of 
the small and new airlines had to leave the market. However, large and powerful 
airlines reached a consensus on predatory pricing in order to drive the price cutters 
out of the market and then to raised prices back to their previous lev e ls .U p  until 
1989, first CAB and then DOT, had given the power to confer antitrust exemptions 
and special treatment of airline mergers when they found the action as in benefit of 
public interest. Therefore there was an uncertainty about the adequacy of the 
antitrust laws.
In addition to predatory pricing, the large carriers begun to dominate and 
organise around hub-and-spoke operations and started to act as new regulators of 
price setting and market entry. In that respect, it might be claimed that the regulated 
oligopoly existed under regulation has been replaced with an unregulated oligopoly 
having long-run adverse impacts on consumers.
Presently, although it seems as if the airlines were to operate domestically in an 
essentially laissez-faire environment, in reality the three incumbents American 
Airliners Inc., United Airlines Corporation and Delta Lines Inc., command the
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domestic market as well as the global industry through getting the judicial spur of 
ADA which protected the incumbents against the a mass of potential new entrants.^^
3.6. Open Skies Policy: A Carrot-and-Stick Tactic to Challenge the
International Aviation System
The ADA virtually overlooked the international air transportation. The open 
skies policy of U.S. was therefore proposed in another document, the International 
Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, lATCA. The lATCA was the indicator 
of the U.S. determination to export competition as a part of its commercial interests, 
in the name of liberalism. The struggle of U.S. against the protectionist states put into 
force with the help of a sophisticated two-pronged stra tegy .O n  the one hand, it 
resorted once again the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy through which it sought to 
expand deregulation by the help of effectively selected liberal bilateral agreements 
and on the other hand it launched the ‘combine and destroy’ tactic, employed under 
the Reagan Administration, which aimed to threat and punish the noncooperative 
states by way of diverting their carriers away from American traffic.^* The ‘open 
skies’ policy of U.S. was based on a carrot and stick strategy aimed to persuade the 
other states to liberalise their international aviation policy and thereby to liberalise 
the international aviation system.
The states conclude liberal bilateral agreement with U.S. would be awarded 
with, pricing flexibility, unrestricted capacity, multiple designations, access to new 
routes and gateways within U.S. markets. In return, the states would approve the 
liberal bilateral agreements that guarantees the reciprocal rights of, unlimited 
multiple designation of airlines, a liberal route structure, free determination by the 
designated airlines of capacity, frequencies and types of aircraft, no limitation on the 
carriage of sixth-freedom traffic, encouragement of low tariffs set by the individual
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airlines on the basis of the marketplace without reference to the ratemaking 
machinery of lATA, minimal governmental interference on tariff matters and 
inclusion of provisions on charter flights.^^
On the other hand, in the context of stick tactic, the permits of foreign carriers 
could be denunciated without a hearing whenever CAB found the operations of that 
carrier, impaired, limited, or denied the operating rights of United States air carriers, 
or engaged in unfair, discriminatory or restrictive practices with a substantial adverse 
competitive impact upon United States carriers, with respect to air transportation 
services to, from, through or over the territory of such c o u n try .In  that respect, a 
state wishing to get the access to U.S. markets and also not to lose the permit, would 
have to restructure its civil aviation laws and competition law in accordance to U.S. 
Few states would agree on the free market doctrine of the U.S. inasmuch as it 
involves reservations connected to the national sovereignty.
As a part of the divide and conquer policy. United States concluded liberal 
bilateral agreements with Netherlands and Belgium in order to encircle Britain and 
sought to make agreements with Greece, Portugal and Spain as to “put the most 
short-term traffic pressure on both France and Italy”.N otw ithstanding the 
enormous American pressure, most of the important aviation powers as well as third 
world and Japan resisted to U.S. made tailor liberalisation philosophy foreseen for 
new international aviation system. As a result, only twenty small like-minded 
partners, such as Netherlands, Israel, Peru, Federal Republic of Germany, agreed to 
negotiate and conclude a liberalising agreement, in return of new routes and 
opportunities, yet even those states showed considerable resistance or reluctance with
35respect to particular clauses and ideas advanced by the U.S. delegations.
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The shortcoming of the ‘open skies’ policy was its negligence of the diverted 
markets in international scene in which each responding to specific national 
requirements. In other words, the way the deregulation applied in a legally 
homogenous industry, where a unique power exercises authority, one legislation 
prevails, a Supreme court arbitrates the judicial differences, regulated interstate 
commerce and all air carriers are privately owned, would fail in extra-territorial 
application on heterogeneous industry.^®
The new international doctrine of the U.S. was the continuation of the long run 
American desire for converting all national systems to its national system. The new 
policy was the most comprehensive attempt hitherto 1944 and brought about strong 
nationalistic reactions to extent led regional oppositions by several countries in 
Africa and Latin America.
Notwithstanding the rise of international relentlessness, the United States CAB 
issued a “Show Cause Order” demanding that why lATA fare-setting activities 
should continue to receive immunity from U.S. antitrust laws despite its 
inconsistency to public in terest.U .S . declared that the lATA tariff agreements 
would no longer be approved and immunised from the application of the antitrust 
laws. The unilateral withdrawal U.S. from lATA would more or less mean the 
termination of lATA rate making mechanism, the only multilateral component of the 
regulatory s y s te m .T h e  U.S. assault against lATA had created an unexpected 
negative reaction within the international aviation community and in two ICAO-
39sponsored conferences unilateralism in aviation had condemned.
Eventually, U.S. suspended the ‘open skies’ policy and CAB removed its 
hitherto charges against I AT A and granted interim approval of the regulatory 
mechanism of lATA as well as continuing to immunise the lATA tariff agreements
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from antitrust laws. United States for the time being declined to impose a new system 
however, the effort did not end without award. In fact United States did not back 
down its aim of reorganising the international aviation system in line with its 
preferences but accomplished its main goal, which was to impress the aviation 
community to move earnestly towards the liberalisation of international aviation 
system and air fares.
At first, lATA felt compelled to reorganise its structure and agreed to make 
optional participation of membership in fare coordination and to provide flexibility to 
carriers in fare determination while replacing unanimity vote with simple majority 
vote. On the other hand, albeit to the return of U.S. to lATA mechanism, the role of 
organisation in the international air transport economic order surely declined even to 
an extent to name it as a trade association rather than a fare setting organisation. As a 
precedent, the organisation’s fiftieth anniversary annual general meeting in 1994 in 
Mexico City only 103, small international carriers, of lATA’s 223 airline members.“*'
The American push for liberalism had created a momentous agitation within 
the advanced countries of Europe. Paradoxically, given to its past history of being the 
supervisor of the protectionist trend against liberal trend of United States, Britain has 
emerged as one of the eager adherents of the liberalism by the beginning of 1980s.“'^  
Britain has got the flag of liberalism, British Airways privatised in 1987, and 
concluded several liberal bilateral agreements with West-Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Belgium while putting pressure on European Community 
Commission for the establishment of a new liberal air transport policy.
In short, the mount of U.S. open skies policy managed to reach the desired 
result of driving both lATA and European Community towards liberalisation. 
However, without the most concrete success in 1982, U.S. would not have
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withdrawn its assault against I AT A. This success was the signature of a 
Memorandum of Understanding, MOU, between United States and European Civil 
Aviation Conference, ECAC, a regional intergovernmental organisation established 
in 1954.
The memorandum established a price band, zone of reasonableness, around a 
reference fare level within which carriers were free to set fares without governmental 
in te rference .In  exchange of these guaranteed zones of flexibility, the CAB 
eventually agreed to suspend its lATA ‘show cause’ proceeding and give acceptance 
to the participation of U.S. airlines once again in multilateral tariff coordination 
procedures.
3.7. The Second Generation ‘Open Skies’ Policy: Clinton/Pena
Encirclement Initiative
The suspension of the ‘open skies’ policy for nearly fifteen years, finalised 
with the coming of Clinton Administration in 1993. In 1993, the fifteen voting 
members of President Clinton’s National Commission to Ensure a Strong 
Competitive Airline Industry, Airline Commission, endorsed a multilateral ‘open 
skies’ policy seeking to replace the bilateral agreements developed under the 
Chicago/Bermuda system. Defining the bilateral system as ‘zero-sum-market 
division’, a highly discriminative and restrictive regulation system incapable of 
supplying the network growth demanded by a global trade environment, the Airline 
Commission sought to the export the new quasi-deregulatory doctrine of U.S. to 
establish a multilateral aviation system.
Considering, the unwillingness of the international aviation community to a 
pro-competitive multilateral system, the Commission, despite the proven forfeiture of 
the first generation liberal bilateral encirclement strategy to produce a new
67
multilateral order, initiated the pro-competitive bilateral strategy to stimulate a âiture 
multilateral settlement.
The first official declaration of the new U.S. international policy has done by 
the U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena in 1995 at the fiftieth anniversary 
commemoration ceremony of the signing of the Chicago Convention. What the 
Secretary dwelled on was the ‘globalisation’ of the international aviation system. 
According to the new bilateral-to-multilateral policy, all of the restrictive provision 
of Chicago Convention will be liberalised through the conclusion of liberal bilateral 
agreements on country-by-country basis. Ultimately, the existing system of bilateral 
treaties and the rules of Chicago system will be replaced with a liberal multilateral 
aviation regime.
The countries conclude the new open skies agreements would be awarded by 
offered attractive service opportunities to U.S. cities. Not necessarily connected to 
the ‘open skies’ policy. United States also granted antitrust immunity to states, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland, in order to encourage 
them and the others to conclude new generation bilateral agreements.
In fact the major attention of U.S. was devoted to five states, Britain, France, 
Australia, Germany and Japan, however, it succeeded to conclude bilateral ‘open 
skies’ agreements with nine smaller European states, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.'*^ The core 
elements of these agreements was as such,'*^
- Unrestricted gateway service, allowing the serve of foreign carriers to all
cities in United States in return of reciprocal unlimited access in other state,
- Multiple permissive designation,
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- Full pricing and capacity freedom of airlines, flexibility stemmed from the 
‘double disapproval’ pricing, which requires both governments to reject a filed 
tariff,
- Full exercise o f ‘beyond’ fifth freedom rights and other traffic rights.
Beyond these core elements, the liberal bilaterals offers, a liberal cargo regime,
open code-sharing, airport self-handling, fair competitive opportunities, non- 
discriminatory operation of and access to computer reservation systems.''*
3.7.1. Repercussions and Critic of Second Generation ‘Open Skies’ Policy 
The liberalisation movement in European Union has already been commenced 
through a series liberalisation ‘packages’ when U.S. unveiled the new international 
aviation doctrine U.S. The liberalisation packages were covering the intra-Union air 
transport relations while no supranational competence had been observed for the 
external borders of the Union. The alignment of six member states to the new ‘open 
skies’ agreements induced political friction between the supranational European 
Commission and these six member states. The argument of the Commission was that 
varied bilateral agreements with third states would inevitably disrupt the functions of 
the EU’s internal single market in aviation. In that respect, the demand of 
Commission was to establish a ‘mandate’ to negotiate the Union’s external air 
transport on behalf of fifteen member states in order to increase the negotiating 
leverage against United States.
In 1996, first the conclusion of a liberal bilateral agreement between Germany 
and United States, the first large-state convert to U.S. encirclement policy, and then 
signing another agreement between U.K. and U.S. aroused conflicts within the other 
non-agreed member states who perceived these treaties as an attempt of creating an 
oligopoly across the Atlantic traffic. By the spur of France, Spain, Italy and other
69
smaller member states, the EU’ transport ministers approved a comprise in June 1996 
that established a ‘split mandate’ for Commission."*^
Outside Europe, the drive for liberalism has been greeted with suspicion and 
cynicism. At an ICAO forum in 1992, Japan Airlines chairman Susumu Yamaji 
defined the ‘open skies’ policy as, “just providing the powerful with the means to 
reach global domination”. Apart from the states having smaller domestic markets, 
efficient carriers and depended on third-state traffic particularly Britain, Netherlands 
and Singapore, most of the other states, most of them are Third World states, 
expressed similar sentiments for the U.S. initiative.
New strategies have developed to confront the tremendous challenge to 
airlines including, merger agreements, strategic alliances, cross-border investments, 
code-sharing arrangements and establish of regional defence coordinations.
Had a critic been made for the ‘open skies’ policy, the main controversy would 
have been founded within the argument itself The doctrine has grounded on the 
unlimited access of operation and the elimination of all restrictions proposed in the 
Chicago system, in favour of the globalisation of the air transportation. On the other 
hand, none of the liberal bilateral agreement expresses a word about the withdrawal 
of the cabotage and nationality principles. Let alone the achievement of a global 
aviation regime, even a liberal system will decline to happen as long as the cabotage 
and nationality rules prevail in the aviation policies.
As a conclusion, it is evident to notice that the U.S. deregulation initiative since 
1979 has paramount significance on the liberalisation of the internal and external 
aviation policies of states yet to recognise as long as U.S. withstand against the end 
of cabotage, which European Union quitted in 1997, and nationality principles, the 
second generation ‘open skies’ initiative will fall in short of achieving the
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globalisation of the international aviation system. Instead it will stimulate the 
establishment of regional cabotage areas excluding the U.S. carriers.
3.8. The Liberalisation Movement in European Union: Transformation 
with Multiple Sovereigns
Referring the U.S. initiative as deregulation, pulling of all a priori government 
interference from air transport activity, the EU liberalisation movement is to be 
called as ‘re-regulation’ that designed to remove all the barriers to air transport trade 
existing within the markets of the Union and to harmonise the internal regulatory 
systems of member states, in order to establish an efficient common aviation market.
In fact, a comparison of the U.S. and EU reforms is not sensible in due account 
of the divergent structures of the European aviation and the U.S. domestic market.
First and foremost, domestic and international air transport markets of U.S. is 
performed by a single regulatory body. On the other hand, the European airline 
market is shared between multiple sovereigns having multiple regulatory 
mechanisms and thousands of bilateral aviation treaties. Moreover, unlike the 
multiple competing private carriers in the United States, the European airline system 
has traditionally been made up of flag-carriers, owned by state and heavily 
subsidised.^* For instance, Aer Lingus, TAP and Olympic Airways are essentially 
100 per cent government owned while government owning is 94.2% of Air France, 
86.4% of Alitalia and 99.8% of Iberia.^^
The geographical distance is another contrast between the U.S. and Europe. 
The physical size of the US domestic market is out of comparison with the European 
market. The entire land territory of the fifteen member states is fractionally larger 
than the corridor of southwestern and western states from Texas to California, and 
thus the average route length for all types of flights in Europe is some 750 kilometres
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whereas in the U.S. its is 1300 kilom etres.Short flights offer less scope for hubbing 
because any time spent changing planes takes up a relatively large part of the overall 
journey. In that respect, indirect flights in Europe, even if fares are lower, are seldom 
going to offer effective competition to direct services as has occurred in the U.S.^‘*
Another point worth exploring is that, traditionally European aviation is mainly 
composed of charter services that enjoy easier market access and offer cheaper fares, 
as compared to scheduled services. The charter services has already been possessed 
certain emancipation since 1956 EC AC Conference, therefore, there was no need for 
a U.S. type deregulation movement.
As a final point, the consequences of U.S. Deregulation Act were mainly 
economic in terms but the liberalisation movement in EU would have political 
results. A common air transport policy established within the framework of the Rome 
Treaty would surrender air sovereignty rights of member states.Conversely, the 
core of the international air transport legal structure were based on the individual 
sovereignty, nationality and bilateralism.^^ For many years, EU nations has 
conducted air transport relations on a bilateral, country-by-country basis, rather than 
through a multilateral EU system.
In sum EU member states opposed any transformation in the regulatory 
structure of aviation. However, the change became inevitable by the years of 1980s, 
in part because of a worldwide change towards a liberalised or deregulated air 
transport market, and in part because of judicial activism of Court of Justice of the 
European Communities as well as the administrative activism of the Commission of 
European Communities.^® However, in contrast to U.S. type radical change, the 
liberalisation process in Europe has achieved in a more phased series of incremental 
regulatory reforms. The European Union had the chance to encounter the difficulties
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through learning from the U.S. experience as well as had time to modify and adjust 
the reform measures in the light of information gathered from the reactions of
market 59
Legitimately, “the European Union has succeeded to find the correct balance 
between competition and control mechanisms in which competition and consumer 
have both benefited.
3.9. The Legal Statute of the Air Transportation in EU: “A Dark Chapter
in the History of European Integration” *^
The potential importance of transportation to European integration had 
recognised at the beginning of the Community’s existence when the Treaty of Rome, 
founding treaty of the Community signed in 1957, granted a special treatment to 
transportation together with agriculture only.
The central purpose of the Treaty of Rome, was to create “an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe”. T o  promote this end, four fundamental freedoms 
were entrenched to the Treaty, the free movement of goods, the free movement of 
persons, the free freedom of services and the free movement of capital. The kernel 
idea, was to enhance the economic prosperity by integrating the economies of the 
member states and to establish an internal market.
Had a beneficial, unified economy was to be maintained between the equal 
members of the Community, the principle of the supremacy of law would be the base 
for all relations amongst members and supranational institutions. In that regard, the 
supranational competition law of the EU was perceived as the essential criterion in 
achieving the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. Competition is seen as the “locus 
of greater user choice and industrial progress”.^ '* The Treaty rests on the premise of 
free competition as given in the Article 3(f), “the institution of a system ensuring that
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competition in the common market is not distorted.”^^  The gist of the EU’s 
supranational competition law is contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. These 
two specific laws prohibits anticompetitive practices such as agreements, concerted 
actions and dominant undertakings affecting the trade, that are incompatible with the 
common market, save for such agreements and practices that advance consumer 
benefits.^^ The actual application of both articles to competitive activity had 
accomplished in 1962, with the enactment of Regulation 17 that authorised the 
Commission to investigate and, if necessary, to order termination of infringements of 
Articles 85 and 86. Along with the other EU law, competition law takes precedence 
over the national law of EU member states.
The Relevant Provisions of the Treaty of Rome; The Treaty excluded 
transportation from the general framework in virtue of its outstanding role in creating 
a unified Europe that requires a special treatment. The integration of Community 
would be achieved through ensuring the free movement of people and goods and out 
of question this could not have been accomplished without an effective infrastructure 
industry. In fact, economically significant in its own right, the transport sector 
supports all other forms of economic activity and facilitates trade that are the key 
considerations in the creation of a customs union and internal market. Moreover, an 
effective transport policy promises social and economic cohesion between central 
and peripheral regions as well as increasing competition by extending the 
geographical range of business, ensuring regional development and improving 
relations with third countries. In aggregate, transport policy has direct and indirect 
connotations with other sectors including regional, social, fiscal, industrial, 
environmental, energy, and external relations policies.
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Given all these strong reasons for pursuing an active transport policy, Article 
3(e) of the Treaty of Rome recognised a mandate to Commission for the creation of a 
common policy in sphere of transport but to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the EU Council of Ministers for the adoption of the legal act.
The founders of the Treaty were well aware of the difficulty to find a common 
ground for the different national transport models of the member states based on 
disparate geographical situations. The public utility connotations of transport 
rendered the sector to be highly regulated, compartmentalised and protected in 
virtually all member states. That’s why, it was not until 1968 that the Council did act 
to bring rail, road and inland waterway transportation within the scope of 
competition laws.
The supranational competition regime provided an exemption to transportation 
in general and air transport in particular from the ambit of the Treaty on the basis of 
Article 84(2),
“ The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and 
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air 
transport”.
Article 84(2) gave member states an excellent legal excuse effectively to 
exclude air transport from the extent of the Treaty. The replacement of restrictive 
bilateralism with competitive multilateralism would fail to secure the survival of the 
national airlines.^* National airlines of most European nations hold dominant 
positions in their own states and price-fixing and capacity limitation agreements 
might be held in violation of Article 86 in virtue of abusing the established dominant
position 69
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In order to exclude air transport from the ambit of Regulation 17, the Council 
adopted Regulation 141 in 1962 and until the 1987/92-liberalisation program, the air 
transport remained outside from the enforcement mechanisms of Regulation 17.
3.10. The Commission versus Council on Air Transport Policy: “To play
Vladimir to Council’s Godot”’*’
The idea of formulating a common European air transport policy is more aged 
than the conclusion of Rome Treaty, as stated by one commentator in 1948, “ If we 
cannot achieve a European operating authority for civil aircraft, we may as well 
abandon all hope of achieving a real European Union”.”  However, as the Spaak 
Report of 1956 ascertained, air transport was one of the three most regulated sectors 
of the economy, together with energy and telecommunications.”  The Rome Treaty 
declined to change the general protectionist practice in air transport.
Article 84(2) immunised air transport from the established portfolios of the 
Commission, “competition”, “transportation” and “external relations”. ”  Despite the 
Commission was not specifically empowered to make proposals to Council of 
Ministers, the Commission continuously submitted draft proposals to Council in 
order to exhort to it to take a legal act for a common air transport. The reason behind 
the persistence of the Commission was because of the monopolistic principles of the 
Chicago system that distorted the operation of intra-EU air services as well as spoiled 
the integrity of the competition rules, crucial for the forthcoming internal market.”  
Several times. Commission pointed out the necessity to take joint actions on air 
service network of the Community, tariffs and the relationship with third countries. 
In response to these concerns, the Council recited in each time that air transport 
policy concerned an extremely complex subject matter loaded with the variables of 
infrastructure, prices, conditions of transport, intermodality, freedom of
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establishment and freedom to provide services, social welfare problems and 
competition/^
The First Memorandum of the Commission; In 1979, the proposal of 
Memorandum 1 by Commission, Contribution of the European Communities to the 
Development of Air Transport Services, indicated signs of unfolding in the direction 
of liberalisation and harmonisation of air transport policies within the Community. 
This first comprehensive study on air transport, asserted that the objectives of the 
Community would be best served by an intra-European network of open access to air 
transport rou tes .T he  Commission called for a ‘phased’ liberalisation program for 
the achievement of full freedom of entry, a review of the structure of bilaterals, an 
examination of state subsidiaries and adoption of flexible tariff procedures in air 
transport.^^ Moreover, the Commission counselled the application of the Regulation 
17 to the air transport.
The First Memorandum declined to propel the Council into taking any 
significant actions, reciting again the vast complicity of reaching consensus in such a 
sensitive area as air transport.
The special concern of the Commission gained momentum in 1982 when the 
European Parliament took the Council of Ministers to the European Court of Justice 
for failing to fulfil its Treaty obligations regarding the introduction of a common 
transport policy, in defiance of 16 Commission proposals on that call. Aside from 
denoting the locus standi of European Parliament, the European Court of Justice got 
the opportunity to reveal its construe by that incident. Accordingly, the Court 
professed that the political, technical or economic difficulties cannot constitute an 
excuse for inaction or for failure to perform Treaty obligations that require the 
adoption of a common position on transport.
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The decision of the Court prompted the Council to issue a Directive concerning 
the authorisation of scheduled inter-regional air services in 1983. In spite of its 
limited practical impact, contains restrictions and exceptions for hubs, the Directive 
was notable on due account of being the first assault on the inviolability of the 
Chicago bilateral system within the EU.^^
It is fair to acknowledge that, the action of Council was in part the work of the 
Community’s institutional pressure and in other part the fulfilment of the two 
important developments happened to within EC AC. These involve the settlement of 
MOU between the ECAC and the Government of the USA in May 1982, and the 
Compas Report, Competition on Intra-European Air Services, initiated by the ECAC 
in 1982 as a response to the First Memorandum of the European Commission.
Before explaining the two, it is to be noted that, ECAC is an inter­
governmental organisation and unlike the supranational character of the EU, its 
decisions do not bind states. Given the sensibility of countries on air transport, EU 
member states embrace liberal adjustments in ECAC that provides flexibility to 
resign from the process in case when the decision challenges national interest.
Establishment of MOU ‘fares zone’ system between ECAC countries and USA 
for trans-Atlantic air routes granted airlines the freedom to set fares without taking 
the approval of their governments. This agreement was the first important challenge 
to the existing bilateral system in fare setting issues albeit limited to only trans- 
Atlantic routes. The second significant challenge to the traditional system came with 
the Compras Report that emphasised the momentousness of the ‘zones’ concept as an 
instrument for the accomplishment greater competition in European air transport.^° 
Although, the member states of ECAC remained averse to the Report, it succeeded to
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advance further the zonal concept and became the model for the liberalisation 
measures on air fares and capacity in EU air transport.
The Second Memorandum: The retreat of the Council to adopt implementing 
legislation for air transport rendered Commission to propose the second 
Memorandum in 1984, modestly described as, Progress Towards the Development of 
a Community Air Transport Policy.
In its second air transport encyclical, the Commission made an accurate 
analysis of the situation of air transport in the world and in Europe and came up with 
a coherent set of concrete proposals for the establishment of a common air transport 
policy. Accordingly, two points were underlined, in the light of the tremendous 
transformation of international air transport system, a gradual liberalisation, 
“evolution rather than deregulation”, had to be introduced in the Community while 
the cooperation amongst members should be improved in order to resist against the 
new international doctrine of United States. To achieve these ends, the proposal 
called for the harmonisation of bilateral agreements between Community States with 
respect to tariff and capacity, application of the competition rules of the Treaty and 
relaxation of national barriers over intra-European bilateral routes.
The Council once again did not take any action, however the very important 
decision of the EC Court of Justice in 1986 made the action inevitable.
The judgment of the Court on the ''Nouvelles Frontières" case inaugurated the 
legal process for the setting up of a common air transport policy. In the case, the 
Court ruled that “like other means of transport, air transport remains subject to the 
general rules of the Treaty including those concerning competition”.^  ^ The Court 
explicitly held that air transport was not exempt from Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome and the Commission might investigate “cases of suspected
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infringement” of Article 85 and 86 and had an infringement been founded, it had the 
right to propose “appropriate measures to bring it to an end”.^ ^
Although the Nouvelles Frontières case had no direct applicability in the 
absence of implementing regulations, it had an obvious warning function towards 
Commission and government authorities. Moreover, it provided the legal base to the 
Commission to push the Council to enact the legislation.*''
On 18 July 1986 the Commission sent letters to ten airlines stating that they 
have betrayed the competition rules of the Treaty by engaging in price-fixing, 
capacity limitations, revenue pooling and restricted market entry. In letters it was 
explicitly mentioned that the unsatisfactory responses could lead to prosecution in 
national courts and the EC Court of Justice. In response, most of the airlines did 
agree to start a formal dialogue with the Commission on the application competition 
rules of Treaty to the bilateral agreements they have concluded. Evidently, the 
Commission in practice inaugurated a process of liberalisation rather than waiting for 
the Council to adopt implementing regulations.
What’s more, the Commission presented to the Council of Ministers a 
landmark “White Paper”, Completing the Internal Market, requested it to take 
decisions on tariff approval, application of the competition rules, and market access 
by the end of the year.
3.11. The Single European Act: Milestone for a Grand Airline 
Liberalisation
The phased introduction of liberalisation of aviation, inaugurated in 1987 with 
the initiation of the Single European Act, SEA, which established an internal market, 
“an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons.
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services and capital is assured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”, by 
December 31, 1992, at the latest.
As a matter of fact, the radical change in the attitude of the Council was not a 
surprise considered the growing trend of liberalisation in the Community.
The progress towards a more liberalised air transport system commenced with 
the conclusion of liberal bilateral agreements, between United Kingdom and 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany. In fact, six nations, 
mainly the Southern European nations, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, 
were reluctant to liberalise their highly protected air transport sectors. Moreover, 
most of the members including France and Germany were against to the idea of 
deregulation, privatisation and abandonment of state aids.
The UK and sometimes Netherlands provided the impetus for implementation 
of deregulatoiy measures in part through bilateral agreements with other nations and 
in other part through exhorting Council to adopt a liberal regulation by applying the 
competition laws of the Treaty of Rome to air transport. The privatisation of British 
Airways made a strong implication over the balances of the Community to extent it 
was postulated that, “when BA was sold, it was an airline plus regulation which was 
being sold”.^ ^
Beyond the individual attempts for liberalisation, two significant ECAC policy 
statements, one was about establishment of a tariff zone, and the other was about the 
limitation of capacity restrictions, propelled the EU states to move toward a 
consensus on a more liberal air transport system.
Another prompt for liberalisation came with the U.S. proposal of bringing all 
the service industries, including airlines, under the free trade mandates of GATT, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in the Uruguay Round started in 1986.
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Sieged by the increased pressure of Community institutions, demands of the 
forthcoming internal market and the growing trend of airline liberalisation both in the 
EU and in world, the Council of Ministers had to initiate the three EC air transport 
liberalisation packages covering years between 1987 and 1997.
At the commencement, the Article 16 of SEA, adjusted the text of the Article 
84(2) to replace the requirement of “unanimously” with “qualified majority”, and 
also issued that the Commission would have the right to propose legislative 
instruments of liberalisation which would be adopted by the Council after getting the 
advise of the European Parliament and Economic and Social Committee.
3.12. The Three EC Air Transport Liberalisation Measures: A Pace
Further From U.S. Deregulation Experiment
Likewise the U.S. Deregulation Act, the three airline liberalisation packages of 
1987, 1990 and 1992 combined to grant freedom to in three target areas of 
liberalisation, described as the tariff setting, market access and the application of 
competition laws to air transport. However, unlike U.S. liberalisation in EC 
completed the multilateral demise of the traditional cabotage by the April 1, 1997.
The trio of reform packages, eventually, granted free setting of fares on both 
scheduled and charter services, opening of intra-EC air routes to authorised EC 
operators, ending of all the cabotage restrictions, applying the Regulation 17 model 
competition code to air transport and lastly in consistent with the pro-competitive 
stance of the Community, the approval of airline subsidies has conditioned on a 
“one-time, last time” basis.
Doubtlessly, the abandonment of the cabotage restrictions, involving the ninth 
freedom, allowing EU-based airlines to serve any points within the EU they may 
desire, is a milestone in the civil aviation history of Europe and virtually the world.
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Beyond its international consequences, elimination of cabotage had notable 
effects on the air transport industry itself and on the consumers. In fact, before the 
legislation some of the members, prominently Italy, Spain and France had had 
serious concerns about the “creaming of the best domestic routes by foreign 
carriers”.*^  Application of ninth freedom would permit, as an example, any EU based 
airline to operate between Rome and Milan with no home connection. In accordance, 
there would appear to be head-to-head competition between airlines on major 
domestic routes of one country in which it has been traditionally served only by the 
national airlines.
Since 1997, domestic services in France, Germany, Spain, Scandinavia, and 
Italy have all become much more competitive in view of enhanced opportunities for 
market entry and elimination of cabotage restrictions. The increased competition 
stimulated the main European carriers to become more productive and efficient. For 
instance, in France Air Liberte and TAT European Airlines have entered the
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domestic market in competition with Air France and AOM French Airlines.
On the other hand, as the major economic activities are clustered in the 
geographical centre of the Community, the national airlines of countries outside the 
core such as Greece and Portugal, also highly inefficient and subsidised do not have 
the thrust to improve their productivity. While, the air transport regulatory rules has 
been able to be harmonised for the intra-Community services, in practice there is a 
growing gap between the core countries and the periphery.
On the other side, as a result of increased competition most of the big 
companies conclude tactical alliances with regional airlines in order to link regional 
cities together, hub-bypass routes, and connect them to core hubs. Nevertheless,
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most of these regional services are operating between such important regional cities 
as Nice or Barcelona, while demanding high fares.
Liberalisation has not yielded immediate large-scale consumer benefits as in 
United States because of being phased in over relatively long transition periods.^® 
Added to all, lifting the cabotage restrictions had extended the domestic competition 
only in few core city pairs. On the other hand, consumers do realize the benefits of 
lower fares, enhanced choice and improved frequencies only when the city pairing is 
served at least by three carriers, as not to create a duopoly, engaged in head-to-head 
competition. Conversely, by 1996 upon 520 airport pairings within the Community, 
only 31, 6%, were served by more than two airlines while 64% were operated as 
monopolies.^'
3.13. The External Aviation Relations of EU: The Lasting Struggle of the
Commission
The three airline reform packages have successfully superseded the Chicago 
system in a multistate environment, but the external aviation relations of the fifteen 
member states are still developed b ila tera lly .In  various times, the Commission 
called the member states to renounce their autonomous bilateral treatymaking powers 
in favour of exclusive competence of the Commission to negotiate and conclude 
extra-Union air transport treaties with third countries.
The Commission argued that variations and fragmentations in bilateral 
agreements with third states leads legal uncertainty and distorts the functioning of the 
EU’s internal single market in aviation.
First and foremost, deficiency of a coordinated Union action in which the 
member states bargain individually, leads to a weaker negotiating position in respect 
to other dominant countries mainly the United States, Japan and other countries of
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the Asia-Pacific region. "^* By combining rights separately negotiated under different 
bilaterals, a third country air carrier, today, exercise fifth freedom rights within the 
Community without an exchange of comparable traffic rights.
This is evident in relations with U.S., especially after the initiation of the new 
“Pena doctrine”. In the absence of common aviation policy. United States got the 
opportunity exercise its traditional “combine and destroy” policy to obtain additional 
rights from the individually negotiated bilateral agreements with both the granting 
state and the receiving state. As an example, the U.S. air carriers have the right to 
pick up new passengers at London as an extension of its New York/London 
transatlantic service and to carry them onward to other EU destination cities such as 
Frankfurt or Rome.^^ On the other hand, a British airline flying from London to New 
York is restricted by cabotage from picking up new passengers in New York for 
continuing service to Chicago. Moreover, a single EU airline get the market access 
right to one specific city in U.S. while the others are excluded. In a highly 
competitive environment, member states are loath to relinquish their existing rights 
to structure their own bilaterals, that they acquire privileged competition 
opportunities.^*^
Actually, the argument of the Commission was sound that the highly 
fragmented bilateral agreements in Community have not only reduce the value of 
traffic rights in the Community but also hampered the development of global 
strategies to achieve greater competitiveness.
The Community maintains that the intra-EU cabotage privileges are a 
“Community asset” and thus they are to be exchanged only for similar rights of 
access to the huge domestic market U.S. market.^* Moreover, given the dependence 
of Community airlines on extra-Community markets, mainly U.S. and Asia-Pacific
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markets, only a common external aviation policy under the mandate of the 
Commission could exploit the exchange of traffic rights in maximum.
To that end, the Commission submitted two proposals to Council, Community 
Relations with Third Countries in Aviation Matters of 1990 and Air Transport 
Relations with Third Countries of 1992, in an effort to exhort the formulation of a 
common policy .R ecen tly , the “Wise Men” Report, Expanding Horizons, 
contemplated in 1994, postulated that an urgent action for a greater harmonisation in 
external aviation policy was essential in order to adopt to the new challenges that 
have been created by liberalisation and are being intensified by globalisation.
Nonetheless, in the absence of a legal base in the Treaty of Rome that 
explicitly authorises the external treaty power of the Commission on aviation, the 
Commission’s legal assertion of exclusive competence in aviation relations has based 
on a handful of articles. Article 113, recognises the supranational regulation of 
common commercial policy, and Article 228, affirms the Commission authority to 
conclude agreements with third states and international organisations.
The limited inclusion of air transport in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, GATS, at the Uruguay Round in 1994, once more opened the lasting debate 
of whether the supranational EU had exclusive competence to conclude international 
agreements, on behalf of EU. The Commission got the opportunity to obtain the 
opinion of the European Court of Justice.
In fact, as seen in the Ahmet Saeed case in 1986, the Court albeit its great 
sympathy to the Commission’s endeavours in formulation of a common aviation 
policy, decided in accordance to the content of the Treaty of Rome. In the Saeed 
case, the Court was asked to decide whether the EC competition law was applicable 
in extra-territorial aviation relations. In its decision the Court stated that the
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competition law of the Community applied only to air transport between EC 
airports.
In its GATS judgement, the Court treated the supranational authority as 
effectively concurrent but noted that competence for extra-Community air transport 
has not as yet become exclusive to the Community since a common external aviation 
policy had not been evolved hitherto.
In sum, the Council would be the only authority in the approval of the 
negotiating mandate of the Commission. That mandate was issued in the fall of 1996, 
even to a limited extent.
3.13.1. The Split Mandate
In 1995, the former Transport Commissioner Neil Kinnock submitted a draft 
“mandate” proposal to the Council of Ministers, reflecting the challenges of the new 
international civil aviation environment created by the new Pena doctrine of U.S. and 
by the growing liberalisation trend evolved through globalisation.
To put pressure on the Council, Kinnock asserted that enforcement proceedings 
under the Treaty of Rome had to be initiated against the six member states that 
concluded “open skies” pacts with U.S., namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg and United Kingdom. Kinnock postulated that the 
subscription of these member states to new U.S. doctrine infringed the EU law on the 
ground that they discriminated against carriers whose home countries have not 
concluded similar agreements, and created serious discrimination and distortions of 
competition. As Kinnock stated in a conference, should the adjournment for the 
mandate was to sustain, the Community would witness “the implementation that is 
not just America first, but America first, last, both ways across the Atlantic, and
within and beyond Europe, and it would be a dereliction of duty for us not to act”.103
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In May 1996, the U.S. encirclement policy won its first large state convert, 
Germany, in turn of immunity from U.S. antitrust laws and a network code-sharing 
alliance between United Airlines and German flag carrier, Lufthansa. Soon after this 
collaboration, in June 1996, the reveal of another agreement designed to integrate the 
global networks of British Airways and American Airlines foreshadowed an 
emerging oligopoly across the Atlantic.
In the presence of the new challenge, albeit the strong resistance of the UK 
government to any grant of supranational negotiating competence to the 
Commission, with the support of France and Spain, the transport ministers of EU 
adopted a resolution in June 1996. Accordingly, the Council of Ministers approved 
the mandate of the Commission to open multilateral aviation talks with the U.S. It 
was, however, a split mandate, which did not represent an exclusive competence to 
negotiate on behalf of the Community either with U.S. or other third states.
The new mandate involved two stages. In the first stage, began in fall 1996, 
the Commission was charged to negotiate “soft” regulatory issues such as investment 
and competition policy. Should significant results were obtained in the first stage, the 
Council would decide to entitle the Commission to negotiate the “hard” rights, the 
traffic rights, on behalf of EU.
To be legitimate, the Council will hesitate to grant competence to Commission 
to negotiate all extra-Union traffic rights as long as it challenges existing public 
international law of air transport. The state sovereignty has been the central concern 
in international air transport industry. The third countries may not be willing to 
recognise the European Union as a sovereign state and to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Community. Moreover, the member states are reluctant to annul the existing 
bilateral agreements that they have concluded with third states.
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Evidently, the split mandate, at least for the foreseeable future, will not 
challenge the bilateral base of the extra-EU air transport system. However, 
considering the liberalisation and harmonisation progress in the air transport of EU, 
one day the EU member states may approve a complete mandate to the Commission 
in order to maximise the benefits against third countries, particularly United States.
3.14. Liberalisation and Developing Countries: A Challenge to the
Chicago/Bermuda Orthodoxy
Air transport as an industry requires high technology, robust economy, large 
capital investment, adequate airport facilities and adequately trained personnel. 
Having all in common, first the Government of U.S.A introduced its Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978, and then the process triggered a chain of reforms of civil 
aviation throughout the developed countries. The similar traditional characteristics 
on competition policy and consumer protection, made the industrialised nations 
advocate more flexibility, in the international civil aviation system. All the 
components of the regulatory system of international civil aviation are 
interconnected and interdependent. Thus any change in the regulatory policy in any 
region of the world inevitably spreads and affects other regions as well.
In contrast to the trend in developed countries towards a more competitive 
aviation system, the developing countries were in seek to assure the existence of 
Chicago system while strengthening its equalising principles and inclining the 
bilateral air transport agreements towards additional protective measures and the 
sharing of economic benefits. Moreover, the developing countries endeavoured to 
obtain more international legal protection, more national rights, a less discriminatory 
access to the market, a more equitable repartition of aviation resources and adequate 
aid from the international community to compensate for their economic weakness as
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to compete on equal footing with the large airlines of the industrialised world. 
They declared that only after these conditions were materialised, they would give 
consent to modify the Chicago system. However, the climax of the problem between 
two groups of nations was stemmed from the overall dissymmetry in economic and 
social structures. Unfortunately, being a technology and a trade, civil aviation 
involves all these divergences.
The benefits of liberalising airline competition appear to be substantial for the 
developed countries but it contains risks for the developing countries. 
Notwithstanding the wide disparities, in size and wealth, between themselves, 
developing countries share similar problems in their aviation. These are described as,
- resources are constrained,
national identification with their airlines is particularly strong, 
aviation is expected to play an essential role in economic and social 
development, promote trade and tourism, secure often indispensable 
supplies of goods, generate employment, bring in foreign exchange and 
help the national image and prestige,
- the lack of strong private sector has led government to operate airline
1 r \ n
services both in domestic and international services,
an inability to develop and implement effective policies and sector 
strategies due to the centralised government control and lack of skilled 
manpower,
social structures are inappropriate to the demands of technological 
development,
the strong belief that the state-owned airlines could not be left to the free 
and occasionally devastating forces of the marketplace.
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- the lack of consumer consciousness.
Taking all these into account, developing states deliberately advocate “ a more 
equitable access to the air transport market, within the existing global legal and 
institutional structure”.
The perseverance of “fair and equal opportunity principle is crucial for the 
developing countries on such matters as entry, designation and exchange of fifth 
freedom rights, as long as the air traffic rights are being regarded as resources in 
limited supp ly .Wi th  respect to tariff setting, multilateral coordination of air tariffs 
through the lATA mechanism is in the interest of airlines of developing countries as 
long as “the divergent economic approaches were balanced in the context of the 
multilaterally agreed minimum prices”.^"
Sharing common problems, the developing countries seek to strengthen the 
multilateral organisations within the international aviation regulatory system not only 
because it provided ample opportunity for disclosing the views of developing 
countries but also reinforce their bargaining power against the stronger aviation 
countries, particularly against U.S. and Europe. Benefited from comprising the 
majority of ICAO, the developing countries succeeded in 1977 and 1980 ICAO 
Special Air Transport Conferences to resist against the U.S. deregulation policy. 
Furthermore, the 1984 Conference rejected unilateral application of national antitrust 
laws through the massive support of developing countries. However, the 
Organisation does not have authority to impose measures on Contracting States and 
therefore leave the developing countries defenceless against the liberalisation 
impulse of developed countries. Among all, as most of the developing countries 
depend on industrialised countries for hardware, technology, and financial, expert
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assistance and “excessive reliance upon capital-intensive solutions funded by aid 
donors”, they had to accept some of reforms for their aviation policy.
At the initial stage, relaxation of controls over entry and capacity had 
introduced but then as the new entrants came with a remarkable competitive 
advantage against neglected, under-resourced and heavily regulated national carrier, 
the governments of developing countries had attempted to regain control. To 
overcome the resource constrains, the developing countries strived to privatise the 
national airlines. In many of the developing countries, privatisation pushed to the top 
of the agenda shortly after the process of liberalisation commenced. The government 
tend to believe that privatisation is the most promising way to promote efficiency 
while freeing them from responsibility to fund the airline. Privatisation of the 
national airline can yield benefits, but these can be placed in jeopardy if the airline is 
not prepared properly. In developed countries, the government first corporatise the 
national airline and then, once able to operate on a commercial basis, it was 
privatised. Without a preparation process exposing the airline to competition, a 
government monopoly can well be replaced by a private sector monopoly.
Beyond the preparation of airline to competition, the situation of inputs 
required for aviation had to be improved before the privatisation or encouraging 
alliances with an established foreign carrier. The vital requirements of airline 
competition such as computer reservation systems and airport infrastructure are 
restricted in developing countries and without these, no gains could be achieved from, 
liberalisation.
The aviation in developing countries, today, is experiencing a period of 
unprecedented turmoil. The pressure on the governments of developing countries to 
privatise the national airline and exposure to competition, makes these countries
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nothing but to adjust measures particularly in the process of globalisation. Scarce of 
financial resources constraint the improvement of technology, airport infrastructures 
and train adequate personnel. The only course open to governments in airline 
liberalisation is to privatise the national airline. However, privatisation without any 
preparation process brought about only inefficient airlines to a very competitive 
international environment. Evidently, the gap between the carriers of industrialised 
world and those of the developing world is growing rapidly.
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CHAPTER IV
PROSPECTS FOR A GLOBAL AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM
To date, the classic power struggle between nations based on the fundamental 
acceptance of state sovereignty have been organised through bilateral agreements, 
universally received as the ideal method to assert the well-being of national airlines 
in international air traffic market.
In fact, the international airline industry has grown at a prodigious rate under a 
bilateral system. Bilateral exchanges have provided a certain degree of stability, 
clarified the rights and obligations of the parties, granted flexibility to achieve 
comprise solutions and reconciled the opposed objectives and foreign air policies of
states 1
Notwithstanding its advantages on practical grounds, the bilateral system can 
not afford further liberalisation of international air transport on a broad scale 
especially in time of increased aviation globalisation.
First of all, the bilateral system does not secure harmonisation, coordination, 
instead contains two-sided nationalism, and optimisation of the world air transport 
network.^ Even though, like-minded states are able to achieve a degree of 
liberalisation in a bilateral agreement, in the absence third country’s agreement on 
transit or fifth freedom agreements, these agreements become inefficient and 
meaningless. Restricted to traffic between two countries or even two cities, bilateral 
agreements simply do not jibe with a more global basis for the conduct of air 
transport services.^
Secondly, thousands of different agreements affected by particular political, 
economic, market philosophy and bargaining strengths of each country render 
fragmentation on international scale and that confines the development of any
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general international regime to govern that international activity in accordance with 
long-term objectives and consistent legal principles.'* Bilateral agreements in most 
cases, products of individual bargaining and short-term comprises. As the 
distribution of gains and losses or bargaining power of the states has changed, states 
attempted to reach new understandings either take restrictive or liberal measures or 
denounce the earlier ones.
Finally, bilateral agreements provide a suitable ground for individually settled 
restrictions that would hardly be the case in a multilaterally agreed regime.
In brief, the nature of bilateralism is limited to develop further liberalisation. 
However it has to be maintained that, “state sovereignty is the basis for protectionism 
by states and bilateral agreements are a manifestation of that attitude”.  ^As long as 
this rule stays, airline industry can not be de-politicised and de-nationalised and 
hence the bilateralism will not be challenged even its scope enlarges and cover 
regions rather than individual states.
The bilateral system is there to stay but the external and internal pressures for 
liberalisation continuously weakens its restrictive stand. These new challenges are as 
such,
- The development of multilateral process within the proposed GATT/GATS 
framework, called as “multilateralism”.
- The development of regional systems such as the new EU system and the 
regional organisations established by the developing countries as a 
defensive response to liberalisation exported from industrialised countries 
described as “regionalism”.
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- The formulation of a new U.S./EU North Atlantic multilateral compact, 
which would develop a competitive regime within itself, called as 
“plurilateralism”.
- The development of new economic forces within the international airline 
industry which surmount the restrictions of bilateral system, lengthy inter­
governmental negotiations and the traditional cabotage and nationality 
constraints, through airline alliances and code-sharing arrangements, called 
as “globalisation.
There is also a minority group advocating the existence of bilateral system. 
Accordingly, globalisation of airlines and a liberal multilateral system will result 
with the domination of few airlines, principally the oligopoly of U.S. carriers. A 
multilateral competitive environment has nothing to offer less efficient airlines but 
allow the efficient airlines to maximise their level of productivity through exploiting 
the resources of the less efficient countries.^
4.1. Free Trade Advocates Multilateralism but No State Interested 
International civil aviation is not an independent industry. The stage of 
economic and technological development, geographical size and situation, 
infrastructure requirements such as trained personnel and airport services are all 
essential elements for the progress of an efficient airline industry. Besides, aviation is 
an interdependent industry and as a trade, it is based on political strength, 
international affiliations and trade relations in other fields.^ The diversities in national 
policies and understandings and the existing bilateral system reinforcing the 
exchange of narrowly conceived national interests has brought about fragmentation 
in international aviation system. However as being a global activity a certain kind of
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cooperation, and internationalism is vitally needed for safe and orderly development 
of civil aviation.
Endeavours for the establishment of a multilateral regulation is not a new 
concept in aviation. However, the U.S. attempt to export its deregulation policy and 
to undermine the role of the only multilateral organisation, I AT A, brought a new 
dimension to multilateralism. From that points onwards, assault for a multilateral 
system have developed in two different lines.
The first advocated that no other forum better suited to the task of achieving 
multilateralism under the auspices of ICAO. In fact, the adherents of this group were 
mainly the developing countries. Constituting, the majority of the organisation, these 
countries have gotten the opportunity to utilise “one state, one vote” principle to 
vote as a bloc against all liberalisation proposals. The trend has principally gained 
momentum with the unilateral attempt of U.S. to restructure the international aviation 
system. The drive towards multilateralism was in fact a defence against liberalisation 
and desire to establish strict universal rules for protectionism. The developed 
countries principally U.S. and EU members had not and will not bound themselves 
with the strict rules of an international organisation. ICAO does not have sufficient 
powers to regulate or initiate any multilateral agreement without these two big 
aviation powers. Even a more active ICAO participation in the Group of 
Negotiations on Services, GNS, works has not been allowed when it applied in 
1990.*
The second move towards multilateralism has developed when it was decided 
in the Punta del Este Declaration (1986) that a multilateral framework of principles 
and rules for trade in services, has to be developed in the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations. The adherents of this group were not states but instead some airlines
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and free trade defenders. Accordingly, should the fundamental components of 
GATT, non-discrimination and the removal of barriers in trade were applied to the 
air transport, the multilateral liberalisation of trade in air transport services could be 
accomplished. Pricing would be done in accordance to free market principles, 
competition would be adjusted for market access and the capacity would respond to 
the needs of the market. Properly employed, it may mean the return to genuine 
internationalism in regulation.^
However, both the industrialised and the developing countries hold the view 
that general trade principles were simply not appropriate for a field specialised as air 
t ransport .A close analysis of the core GATT principles. Most Favoured Nation, 
MFN, treatment and National Treatment, evidently discloses that GATT could 
actually hamper rather than enhance further liberalisation of air transport.
The MFN treatment, the corner stone of the GATT system, requires that any 
concession granted to a member state be automatically and unconditionally extended 
to all signatory states. With regards to air transport, states granted market access to 
one state had to grant the same degree of access to all GATT members. This would 
mean that the benefits, privileges and concessions that exchanged bilaterally on 
reciprocal basis would need to be revised. The disparity of the air transport markets 
would not allow such outcome. States with small and inefficient markets would 
demand concessions in larger yet would have no incentive themselves to liberalise.
On the other side, states with large markets would disincline to extending 
concessions so long as the benefit has boosted.
Similarly, the national treatment rule emphasises non-discrimination as such 
that foreign suppliers must receive the treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to domestic suppliers. This rule is directly in conflict with the cabotage rule
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and no country in the world, if to accept the EU cabotage region as one state, have 
permitted non-discriminatory access to foreign operation within its domestic market.
In fact. United States has opposed substantive inclusion of aviation in GATS 
framework and presented a formal draft agreement on trade in services providing for 
possible exclusion of certain services from its scope. A similar attitude has been also 
taken by Japan.. Funnily, the international community once again, after Chicago, 
reached a consensus for not establishing a multilateral system.
The U.S. opposition was largely ranged from the nonreciprocal nature of 
liberalisation under the GATS, “most favoured nation” and “national treatment” 
approach. First and foremost, application of MFN treatment would extent equal 
access to all states whereas U.S. airlines would not receive comparable benefits. 
Along with that, the government would be declined to protect the interests of the 
U.S. airlines from unfair foreign competition especially in regards of Japan, Brazil, 
Korea and “other plan-driven economies”.'^ Moreover, the U.S. open skies policy 
would practically be busted under MFN rule, for example, the unlimited “gateway” 
policy in the liberalised U.S./Netherlands bilateral, would not yield any benefit for 
both when employed by all states.
In like manner, in such a large and deregulated market of U.S., the foreign 
airlines would get the opportunity to operate freely in accordance with the rule of 
national treatment but the U.S. carriers on abroad would have to operate in heavily- 
regulated closed markets. Moreover there was no effective dispute settlement 
mechanism of GATT to solve the problem of market equivalence. Among all, there 
were no generally agreed proposals in the framework of GATT, governing the rules 
for government subsidiaries.
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Consequently, it was decided that the provisions of the agreements must apply 
to an agreed list of activities in the area of “soft” ancillary rights, such as ground 
handling, aircraft repair and maintenance, computer reservation systems, CRS and 
selling and marketing of air transport services.''* The “hard” economic rights, chiefly 
those of market access, routes, capacity and pricing, left to the bilateral dealings of
states. 15
In sum, it is to be noted that the successive of GATT, World Trade 
Organisation, WTO, at least for a foreseeable future will not play a role in the 
liberalisation of “hard” rights of air transport services. The principles of MFN and 
national treatment have discouraging effects on more liberal-minded states from 
liberalising their domestic markets and bring no common ground to encourage less 
liberal-minded states to act similarly.'^ In the absence of reciprocity and sectoral 
balances, no state will accept the WTO regime in air transport regulation.
On the other hand, liberalisation of international air transport alone does not 
provide ground for the establishment of a multilateral legal order. A multilateral legal 
order can only be established through a new assessment of principles and norms that 
govern the relations of states on the subject of the air transport. However, without 
the resolve of leading problem of diverge economic and social development between 
different parts of the world, it is hard to envisage any universal agreement on 
common legal norms. Without these perquisites, a broad based liberal multilateral 
agreement might plagued by the “lowest common denominator” problem, creating “a 
new layer of essentially duplicative and wasteful regulation” and engender a new
1 Q
regulation even less liberal than current bilateral practice. In that sense, 
multilateralism does not offer a guarantee for liberalism.
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4.2. Regional Multilateralism: A Step Backwards to Liberal
Multilateralism?
The bilateral aviation system fortifying worldwide fragmentation has become 
increasingly untenable. On the other hand, it has proven in GATT experiment that, a 
global multilateral instrument for aviation is currently unattainable.'^ In that sense, 
the peculiarities and the different features of national aviation policies can be 
reconciled more easily by regional arrangements where problems and perceptions are 
more likely to be common in same geographic locations.
In fact, the regionalism trend is not only narrowed with aviation but more 
significantly centred around economic and political issues. However as the need for 
communication and travel augmented with the growth of economic and trade 
relations within the regional establishments, the role of aviation has incredibly 
expanded. Air transport is not only an instrument enabling communication, travel 
and trade activities but also a huge economic and trade industry within itself In that 
context, regional organisations while striving to strengthen the air transport industry 
because of its supplementary role of in trade and social relations between and beyond 
the region, they also seek to improve the position of air transport industry in regards 
of its share in global trade in services market.
States disjoined to any regional economic organisation are also inclined to 
adjust some measures concerning air transport on regional basis, principally after the 
encirclement strategy of U.S. and new developments within the EU. Thus, the 
régionalisation of the interests has become a major notability of aviation in these 
days. The trend has prompted by such motivations, to fortify the bargaining position, 
shift the balance of benefits, get fuller exchange of rights and to liberalise air 
transportation at least on regional basis.
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Beyond the prominent precedent of EU, less advanced but no less encouraging, 
regional arrangements are gaining strength in various parts of the w o r l d . A  
multilateral air transportation agreement regulating the commercial aviation relations 
within its respective region of Andean Group in South America, comprising Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela had recently put in to force. More tentative 
arrangements envisaging possible regional agreements such as Mercosur, including 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Central America and Caribbean are under 
discussion. Similar arrangements between Australia and New Zealand, in 
conjunction with the countries of South Pacific, has been contemplated.
Beyond these liberally motivated regional arrangements, there are also 
examples defensive unions such as the “Arab cabotage” policy and there are 
regional inclinations in Africa to settle common ground for the exchange of fifth 
freedom rights in order to strengthen the negotiating position in bilateral discussions 
with third countries.
As a matter of fact, regional coordination of interests involves both beneficial 
promises and some drawbacks and risks for the progression of global aviation.
First of all, regional arrangements provide the like-minded states the 
opportunity to consolidate their markets and to develop a more uniform body of air 
transport regulations within the respective region.^^ Harmonisation of rules will result 
in commercial efficiency and overall stability in the international system. Moreover, 
comparable regional markets can exchange fuller traffic rights, including cabotage, 
on a bilateral basis and ultimately with the link up of these regional blocks, a truly 
universal multilateral regime may emerge.^^ Moreover, as the bargaining positions of 
the developing countries be strengthen, they might be more willing to integrate into 
the global system.
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On the other hand, while the consolidation of the position of one block is in the 
benefit of the insiders as long as it aggregates the negotiating position, it may be 
perceived as a threat to third states and give rise to fears and grave concerns, 
particularly among smaller states. Threatening may provoke the creation of counter­
blocks and with the intensified perceptions of block power may discriminate against 
third states. Inter-regional confrontations may render international power struggles 
and through the expansion of nationalist and protectionist inclinations across the 
region, arbitration would be more difficult than ever.^  ^This is a real danger for such 
kind of an industry of aviation that benefits from international solidarity and 
worldwide integration.
Given the potential adverse implications of regional integration, the recent 
developments in EU, ending the intra-EU cabotage restrictions to Community 
airlines, raised reactions from United States, Japan, other Asia-Pacific countries and 
Africa as well as from the other parts of the world. The greatest concern is if EU 
Commission negotiate air service as a block and if the air service within the Union is 
going to be treated as cabotage for non-EU airlines.
In fact, two inclinations are evident in the external relations policy of the EU 
Commission, first to harmonise the air service regulations of non-EU European 
countries and squeeze U.S. to extend some sort of cabotage rights to EU-airlines in 
turn of retaining the fifth freedom flights of U.S. carriers within the EU market.
Both attempts require the Council’s attribution of mandate to the Commission.
In spite of the difficulties surrendering the Commission’s external competence in air 
transport, the Council authorised the Commission to conclude agreements with some 
of the non-EU European organisations and individual states, including, European
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Free Trade Area, EFTA, ECAC, as well as Norway, Sweden and the Eastern 
European countries such as Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia.
Evidently, the basic concern of the EU is to harmonise the air service 
regulations in overall European air transport market that is larger than the territory 
comprising the fifteen member States of the Union. Given the close economic and 
social affinity between EU and the countries mentioned above, conclusion of a 
regional multilateral agreement is a vital requirement. For years, ECAC has 
successfully coordinated and more or less harmonised the air service regulations of 
the 32 member states, comprising both the EU and non-EU countries. It has fathered 
important international legal instalments such as the 1956 Agreement on 
Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services in Europe, 1967 International 
Agreement on the procedure for the establishment of tariffs for scheduled air services 
and it has acted as the forum for the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding 
between the U.S.A and ECAC members states. Besides, many of the published 
reports of it provided a stimulus for liberalisation of intra-European air transport 
regulation.
The EU Commission therefore, considers ECAC member States, not members 
of the EU as ‘partners’ rather than as ‘competi torsHenceforth,  EU will not 
exclude these states from its future common air transport policy and market, but will 
probably ask them to adjust their national air transport policies parallel to the EU. On 
the other hand, the foregoing does not mean that, ECAC countries outside the EU 
will be totally absorbed in EU’s common transport policy and market, especially 
after the elimination of cabotage restrictions within the Union by 1997.
Hypothetically, if the EU gets the mandate to negotiate the external aviation 
policy of the Union, it will probably seek to extend liberalisation in Europe as a
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whole, however the situation may not be as such for the large aviation powers 
principally U.S., Canada and Japan. As has been indicated by the Commission itself, 
the intra-EU cabotage privileges are perceived as a “Community asset” and thus 
should be explicitly traded for similar rights of access to the domestic markets of 
large, populous, industrialised nations such as United States and Canada.
Such kind of an EU action may be received by these big aviation powers as a 
defensive/aggressive attack and might prompt the formation of counter-blocks such 
as, U.S.-Canada-Mexico and probably Israel, while other regional groups may 
emerge in South America, Central America, thé Caribbean, among the members of 
Association of South-East Asian Nations, ASEAN, and in Asia-Pacific region.
Among all, regional formations between developed countries will make 
regional arrangements among developing countries inefficient, as long as their 
bargaining strength remain unchanged with respect to the blocks formed by the 
developed countries.
Regionalism is the dominant trend in international aviation and EU is in a 
position to act as the catalyst for change. Regionalism may provoke a stimulus 
towards a liberal multilateral aviation regime or towards a fragmented and restrictive 
system.
4.3. A Blueprint for a Plurilateral Regime: Seeking the Highest Common
Denominator
The idea of achieving a multilateral agreement between a limited number of 
states, not necessarily belonging to the same region or having similar geographical 
and population size, but sharing liberal philosophy in exchanging the commercial 
rights for the international air services, had first postulated by the Netherlands in 
1981. According to the draft “plurilateral air transport agreement”, a flexible
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mechanism had foreseen for progressive liberalisation by way of establishing a 
regime of free trade principles between major aviation powers on the basis of 
reciprocity. The other nations seeking to join the agreement have to satisfy the 
highest denominator requirements such as the elimination of public subsidies, airline 
privatisation, liberalisation of domestic regulations, end of managed trade, 
eradication of CRS, monopolies and acceptance of dispute resolution procedures.
In fact a plurilateral agreement is a combination of multilateralism and 
regionalism. The lack of reciprocal access and the lowest common denominator 
problems in a multilateral regime and the possible repercussions of regionalism 
namely fragmentation and generation of protectionist blocks would be eliminated 
with the core principle of pluralism defined as “equal economic opportunity” among 
air carriers and with the extensibility of the agreement capable to ensure a global 
regime, based on the reciprocity.
Globalisation requires a more comprehensive settlement of air service 
regulation. Neither U.S., whose federal airspace is protected with strict cabotage and 
nationality rules, nor the EU whose membership is limited to a group of 
economically integrated and fairly similar countries, are likely to achieve a broad 
multilateral system. On the other hand, the emerging EU single aviation market 
provides a unique opportunity for a plurilateral integration with U.S. federal 
airspace.^^ Should the EU Commission get the competence in external aviation 
relations, a strategic alignment of the U.S. and EU aviation market could establish a 
transcontinental zone of free and fair competition.^* The plurilateral treaty creating a 
unified airspace between two big powers would transcend the Chicago system and 
globalisation of the world’s aviation industry would be attained through the 
motivation of the other aviation powers that satisfy the highest common denominator
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requirements. The core group of signatories would involve the neighbours and 
strategic alliances of the U.S. and EU, namely Canada, Mexico, and the EC AC 
countries, that have similar aviation policies in conjuncture with the two big aviation 
powers.
A possible plurilateral agreement would involve revolutionary principles to the 
Chicago system. Under the proposed regime, the airlines of contracting states would 
operate under uniform, objective rules of nondiscrimination and equality of 
competitive opportunity, with freedom to access markets, establish prices and 
determine frequency of services.Accordingly, each airline will develop its trade 
policy rather than serving the objectives of its government. In fact, this requirement 
would more or less mean the end of the ownership rule, which obliges certain portion 
of the voting interest be owned or controlled by the citizens of the respective state. 
With regards to the nationality rule, registration and certification procedures will be 
completed by the national authorities, due to the safety and security reasons, but to 
be done in accordance to the commonly settled rules and under the supervision of a 
supranational commission.
Along with the denationalisation of the airlines, the airspace should also be 
depoliticised through securing unobstructed market access to all city-pairs on both 
continents, including the cabotage routes.
The plurilateral agreement will elude the tariff approval authority of the 
governments and the pricing will be a matter for the market. Along with that, lATA 
will no longer act as an instrument for the tariff setting process.
Subsidies or other anti-competitive actions disturbing competition will be 
eliminated with established antitrust rules administrated by supranational institutions. 
All the airlines will have to acquiesce in the supranational jurisdiction of these
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institutions holding enforcement powers, including imposition of fines and 
penalties.
In consequence a multilateral liberal aviation regime will be attained through 
articulation of coherent principles within a plurilateral treaty opened, to every willing 
and able state.
On the other hand, despite its procompetitive stand, U.S. international aviation 
policy have never made reference to cabotage extinction in its proposals for a 
liberalised global air service market. The incomparable size of the domestic market 
provides U.S. a unique bargaining strength in bilateral treaty transactions and U.S. 
government would not likely to trade off that strength to unequitable mutual 
abolition of cabotage restrictions with EU that is miles away from the U.S. territory.
In addition to the third countries outside the plurilateral would distort the new 
aviation regime. The agreements between the signatory state and third state will be 
based on Chicago bilateral system, thus the perseverance of cabotage and nationality 
restrictions will let the emergence of two market structure in the interconnected 
global aviation market. Furthermore, the prerequisite of adherence described as the 
satisfaction of the “highest common denominator” requirements thwarts the organic 
integration of developing countries into the global system.
Finally, a plurilateral system is still a hypothesis envisaged an intended 
international aviation system. Regardless to its advantages and repercussions, neither 
U.S. nor EU official agendas come to grip with such a plurilateral agreement, that 
merges their airspaces, since the EU Commission has not yet taken the mandate on 
negotiating the external relations of the Union.
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4.4. Globalisation: Airline Alliances Meeting the Millenninni
As the international air transport industry has grown and matured, it has 
struggled to function within a regulatoi^ structure that has failed to keep pace.^' The 
nationality principle and cabotage exclusions frustrate the commercial development 
of international air transport industry. The growing globalisation tendency among 
both flag carriers and privately owned airlines, including, revenue pooling, 
interlining of reservation systems, code-sharing and acquisition of ownership in 
foreign airlines, brings about “c/e facid ' challenges to the legal restraints of the 
Chicago system. In fact, the strategic alliances among airlines are independent from 
the international regulatory system and there are no internationally agreed principles 
to govern these agreements.
The term of globalisation referring the airline alliances is a worldwide-accepted 
phenomenon. Both the efficient airlines of the developed countries and the inefficient 
airlines of the developing countries embrace this growing trend albeit with different 
reasons. The drive of the former one is to obtain adequate market access to strictly 
regulated and protected markets while the latter one urges to compete with the large 
and highly efficient carriers of other increasingly liberalised foreign marke ts . In  
common, both stands welcome the mergers in the air transport sector on the basis of 
efficiency gains namely cost reductions, growth of passenger traffic, consolidation of 
resources and higher priority in the computer reservation systems.
4.4.1. Code-Share Agreements Challenges the Chicago System
While other forms of airline alliances are feasible, the recent developments 
indicate that the code-sharing alliances are the most expansive and notorious ones.
A code-sharing arrangement is the integration of several parts of the respective 
operations of two participant airlines. Both partners benefit from that agreement
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because passengers tend to chose the respective airline that offers an integrated 
service. The existence of cabotage restrictions impede further operations of the 
airline within a foreign domestic air traffic market, other than the national air carriers 
of that country. The prerequisites of the nationality rule are defined as the majority 
ownership and control by citizens, prohibits conventional corporate mergers and 
acquisitions among airlines of different states. Considering the increase in demand, 
the only course open to the airlines is to make code-sharing agreements and persuade 
the passengers that there is an integrated service although it is partly operated by its 
partner.
The globalisation in aviation is not limited to bilateral agreements between two 
partners. The approach for a strategic global alliance is consummated with the Star 
Alliance that created a global spanning network embracing the operations of seven 
airlines; United Airlines, Lufthansa, Air Canada, Scandinavian Airlines System, 
Singapre Airlines, Thai Airways International and Varig Brazilian Airlines.^^ There 
are also other global airline alliances such as Atlantic Excellence, One World, 
Qualifier and Wings Alliance.^''
The new open skies policy of U.S. brought a new dimension to the code­
sharing agreements. Two types of code-sharing agreements developed in recent 
years. The first type involves the international operations, other than cabotage routes, 
in which the flight code of one airline is used by the aircraft of the allied airline. 
Highlighting it with an example, Lufthansa may put a service on Amsterdam/Mexico 
City route under its own airline code, albeit the operation necessitates a Chicago 
connection that will be operated by its partner, USAir, serving on the 
Chicago/Mecixo City segment. Through that alliance both partner will benefit 
because this coding provides unlimited “blind sector” rights through which the
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bureaucratic obstacles for the market access permit will be eliminated for Lufthansa 
while the U.S. Air get the privilege to increase the number of passengers through 
picking up new passengers from Chicago. The code-share facilities the trade through 
diminishing the operation cost and provides service opportunities to destinations that 
would otherwise be cancelled because of the high expenditure.
The second type of code-sharing agreement involves cabotage routes. For 
instance, BA advertises a London/Pittsburgh service although it entry is granted in 
London/New York route. Its partner USAirs will operate further flight to Pittsburgh.
Although the code-share agreements have no legal inconsistency with the 
existing Chicago system, it appears a camouflage act for cabotage and nationality 
rules. Whether the regulatory system changes to multilateralism or regionalism or 
become more liberal, the increasing number of airline alliances indicate that airlines 
have found their private solution for globalisation.
The airline alliances promote globalisation in aviation but this does not mean 
that it promises competition and consumer choice. First of all, experience in the U.S. 
and the UK indicates that the innovation and main spur to competition is most likely 
to come from the medium sized airlines or from the new entrants, with resources 
needed to grow quickly.However, most of the medium or small sized airlines have 
been captured by larger air carriers and had no chance to survive other than flying 
under the designator of a major carrier. Moreover, the large airlines prefer to form 
alliances among themselves and as holding the dominant position in hubs, they are 
capable to foreclose the entry of new airlines or forestall the expansion of existing 
carriers.
CRS is an electronic system offered by a carrier to travel agents that involves 
the operating information of that carrier’s schedule, fare and frequency to the
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respective designation. Mega carriers own their reservation network and capable to 
require the travel agents to register their flights and the flights of airlines associated 
with them in code-share alliances at the first ranks of the list displayed on the screen.
Competition on major points of international markets has been curtailed 
because of less price competition and fewer choices in consequence of alliance 
between the airlines, diminished number of entrants and the impartiality in CRS.
The second disadvantage is seen as the consumer deception. Passengers may 
not be informed that another carrier would in part seiwe the on-line service.
Notwithstanding the drawbacks of airline alliances, the U.S. government 
continues to spur international code-sharing alliances as a way of enhancing the 
global service options and strengthening the “open skies” policy. What the U.S. 
authorities failed to achieve in bilateral negotiations, are obtained through the 
practices of the U.S. carriers, which got the opportunity to have direct access to the 
protective markets.
The EU Commission, however, stands more sensitive to the airline alliances 
whether they distort the competition in the Community or not. Additionally, the EU 
code of conduct on CRS facilities obliges the display of the flight whether it is a 
code-share or non-stop flight and also name the connecting partners if involved. 
Nevertheless, while the merger regulations are being applied to alliances and 
agreements between airlines within the member states of the EU, strategic alliances 
concluded between EU and non-EU carriers fall outside the scope of European 
regulations.^''
Finally, it is to be noted that, although the airline alliances promote 
globalisation in aviation, the consequences appear to fall short of achieving the 
premises of the globalisation. The mega-carriers will benefit from the code-share
1 1 2
agreements as long as they gain market access to foreign markets, strengthen their 
positions in hub-and-spoke system and reduce the level of competition through 
imposing a degree of control over the operations of the smaller carriers. The 
restrictive principles of the Chicago system also provide them the opportunity to 
arrange the domestic operations of smaller airlines of the foreign countries, that, in 
fact, forestall the development of the aviation industry in developing countries as 
well as detriment the progress of competition in international aviation industry.
The lack of international rules and an organisation declines the fugitive 
relations of unequal allies continue for a long time. Most of the alliance are made 
during the travel seasons and fail with the end of it. Instability impedes the 
development of long-term strategies to challenge the Chicago system.
At the end, although the airline alliances spur the development of a competitive 
global aviation system, in the absence of international norms of competition and a 
regulatory international organisation, the competition can not afford worldwide 
liberalisation in the regulatory system. The inconsistency of the protective regulatory 
system and the development of a competitive global market in practice aggravate the 
turmoil in international aviation system.
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CONCLUSION
The international aviation is experiencing a period of unprecedented 
disturbance. The process of globalisation urges liberalisation, competition and 
multilateralism. Although states are coming to accept the fact that narrow unilateral 
or bilateral approaches are ineffective to meet the fundamental changes in the global 
system, the optimum balance between regulation and liberalisation has not yet been 
consummated on a global basis.
Captured by the legal obstacles of the Chicago system, defined as state 
sovereignty, nationality and cabotage, air transport has excluded from the normal 
practices of modern globalised business. Although airline liberalisation movements 
are becoming increasingly common, no authentic globalisation of the international 
aviation system will be possible without the exclusion of these pillars.
However, aviation as proven in the recent the final text of the GATS where the 
“hard” air traffic rights are excluded from multilateral treatment, no state in the 
world, even the most market-oriented ones, is prepared to convert its national air 
transport market to a multilateral system emancipated from cabotage and nationality 
restrictions. In that regards, a multilateral agreement based on GATT principles are 
now unattainable to international civil aviation system.
In fact, multilateralism in air transport regulation has not yet found a 
significantly firm motivation of its own. As long as the geographical size and 
location, stage of development, the efficiency of hub-spoke network system, the size 
of domestic traffic market, represent important divergences from country to country, 
states will prefer to exchange traffic rights on reciprocal basis where balance the 
benefits is secured.
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The growing trend of regional arrangements may promote liberalisation and 
harmonisation between the particular contracting states. However, even in the EU 
where cabotage restrictions are fully eliminated, the external relations of states are 
still being conducted by the bilateral arrangements. However, the balances in 
international aviation system may shift in case when the EU Commission obtained 
the negotiating mandate for the external relations of the Union. The integration of 
sovereign airspaces of member states into a single aviation market will shift the EU 
market judicially comparable to the unified airspace of United States. The 
Commission may then ask for cabotage rights from the U.S. domestic market.
At that point, if EU turns to protectionist for the exchange of fifth freedom 
rights within its cabotage area, regional counter blocks may emerge. The bilateral 
system may be replaced with regional bilateralism and a closed region is more 
restrictive and protectionist than a closed bilateral.
On the other hand, a liberal plurilateral agreement merging the airspaces of 
U.S. and EU may transform the Chicago system. The other willing and able states 
satisfy the highest denominator requirements will also join to the treaty. While the 
new plurilateral system attain a certain degree of multilateralism, the relations 
between contracting states and non-allies will be concluded in accordance to the 
principles Chicago system. Two types of aviation systems will distort international 
solidarity and forestall the organic integration of developing countries to the 
international aviation system.
Finally, strategic alliances and multi-airline pacts are spreading enormously 
and transforming the aviation industiy towards globalisation. The code-share 
agreements in practice challenge the restrictive provisions of the international air 
transport system. However, airline alliances and code-sharing agreements also raise
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real concerns about the competitiveness and market domination. The uncertainty 
about the endurance of the established alliances impedes the institution of long-term 
expectations.
The requirement for the transformation of the outmoded international aviation 
regulatory system is evident in a globalising world order. However the newly 
emerging trends are not likely to offer transformation in the short run. In that sense, it 
appears that, at least for the foreseeable future, air rights will continue to be 
exchanged in accordance to the restrictive principles of Chicago/Bilateral system.
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